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94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016)

PRECEDENT IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION*
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN**
In interpreting statutes, judges frequently refer to their obligation
to avoid substituting their own policy preferences for those of the
legislature. This principle, “legislative primacy,” has been the
most significant motivation for the movement against the use of
such extrinsic evidence of legislative intent as a statute’s
legislative history. This history is not enacted and can be cherrypicked by judges or anyone else wishing to create a narrative that
favors one side or the other.
This Article addresses another source of evidence that is not
enacted and is subject to selective citation: judicial decisions. U.S.
judges are relentless in citing each other as reasons for deciding
statutory cases. On occasion, citations demonstrate that the issue
before the court has already been decided. Most of the time,
however, courts cite each other to demonstrate coherence with a
legal narrative, whether the law’s enactment history, the social
history surrounding its enactment, the courts’ jurisprudence
concerning other issues involving that statute, or the relationship
between the law in question and the corpus juris. Also included
are citations to other cases that have employed the various
canons of construction and even cases that have applied everyday
language one way or another.
The goal of this Article is to evaluate these references in terms of
which ones legitimately advance rule of law values. It does so by
examining one five-to-three and two five-to-four United States
* © 2016 Lawrence M. Solan.
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Supreme Court decisions in detail. Some citation practices, it
argues, should be eliminated altogether. Others are legitimate if
justified by analogical reasoning. Still others are legitimate as is.
The Article further addresses the extent to which the use of
citation is a by-product of common law reasoning infiltrating the
statute-based legal system in which we now live.
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But though I have no quarrel with the common law and its
process, I do question whether the attitude of the common-law
process judge—the mind-set that asks, “What is the most
desirable resolution of this case, and how can any impediments
to the achievement of that result be evaded?”—is appropriate for
most of the work that I do, and much of the work that state
judges do. We live in an age of legislation, and most new law is
statutory law.
—Justice Antonin Scalia1
INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia was entirely right. We do indeed live in an age of
statutes, with a judiciary of common law judges.2 And in their role as
statutory interpreters, judges, at least in principle, have less discretion
than they do as the developers of the common law. Aware of this
limitation, judges recognize the need to constrain themselves in
statutory cases, reminding themselves and their readers of their
proper role, which is subordinated to enforcing the decisions that the
legislature has already made in enacting the statute under
consideration. Thus, judges have frequently commented on their
obligation not to substitute their own values for the decision of the
legislature but rather to enforce the legislative will.3
Much of the discussion about judicial restraint in statutory cases
has centered on the legitimacy of relying upon inferences of
legislative intent4 and the dangers of considering the purpose of a law,
except to the extent that the purpose can be inferred from the

1. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
2. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–6
(1982); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479, 495–
97 (2013).
3. See, e.g., H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 246 (1989); FTC v. Cement
Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 738 (1948) (quoting Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533,
573 (7th Cir. 1946) (Burton, J., dissenting) (“We know of no criticism so often and so
forcibly directed at courts, particularly Federal courts, as their propensity for usurping the
functions of Congress.”)).
4. RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 3 (2012); ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 87, 198–202 (2006); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16–18; John F. Manning,
Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 427–39 (2005).
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language of the statute itself.5 Scalia himself argued that this lack of
discipline is the result of common law judges failing to recognize that
they now live in a statutory world that more resembles a civil law
system.6
This Article does not further the debate over those issues but
rather adds another consideration: the use of precedent.7 It is the
unconstrained reliance on precedent—rather than the consideration
of purpose or intent—that distinguishes how common law and civil
law judges interpret statutes. In fact, civil law judges generally apply a
purposive approach to statutory interpretation—“teleological
interpretation”—tempered by limitations in the statutory language.8
That is, they regard their obligation as furthering the purpose of the
statute without doing so to such an extent as to nullify the statutory
language. Legislative intent, including intent gleaned from a review of
both enactment history and context surrounding the enactment, is
also fair game.9 For the most part, such principles of interpretation in
civil law jurisdictions are found in treatises, but in some instances,
they are codified. The Spanish Civil Code, for example, structures
interpretation as follows:
Rules shall be construed according to the proper meaning of
their wording and in connection with the context, with their
historical and legislative background and with the social reality
of the time in which they are to be applied, mainly attending to
their spirit and purpose.10

5. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 20 (2012). For an excellent discussion of the
purposive method in the U.S. courts, see Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress:
Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99
GEO. L.J. 1119, 1147–53 (2011).
6. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 13–14.
7. I note, though, that I have taken an intentionalist position on these issues
elsewhere. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION (2010). In particular, see chapters three and four.
8. See, e.g., REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS
69–72 (Kirk W. Junker & P. Matthew Roy trans., 10th ed. 2006).
9. See id. at 70–71; Holger Fleischer, Comparative Approaches to the Use of
Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 401, 408–09 (2012)
(writing of German practice: “No one today argues for a ‘strict’ objective theory
proscribing the use of legislative history, just as no one supports a ‘pure’ subjective theory
which would forever bind the interpreter to historical legislative intent”).
10. C.C., ch. 2, art. III (1889) (Spain). A translation is available at Spain, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=221319 [https://perma
.cc/3SJH-VYW5].
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Other civil law legal systems make similar use of legislative history
and purposive interpretation.11 Moreover, the plain meaning rule
plays a more subordinate role in civil law systems.12 Thus, it may be
too simplistic to say that when American judges consider legislative
history or statutory purpose they fail to escape their common law
orientation—after all, civil law judges follow a similar approach to
statutory interpretation.
On the other hand, American judges are unrelenting in their
citation of earlier decisions as a reason to construe a statute one way
or the other. Civil law judges are generally not wedded to this
approach. Moreover, while the selective use of legislative history in
American courts has been a subject of concern to judges and
commentators alike,13 the selective use by judges of judicial precedent
in statutory cases has received less attention.
Recent scholarship on the interpretation of statutes by state
courts suggests that the propensity of the federal courts—the
Supreme Court in particular—to rely so much on their own words and
so little on those of the legislature is all the more remarkable.14
Relatively little of the federal judiciary’s work is common law based,
at least not in the traditional sense of common law.15 Yet, when
federal judges interpret statutes, the opinions often assume the tone
and argument structure of common law judges, relying on case law as
a principal form of argumentation.

11. See, e.g., Michel Troper, Christophe Grzegorczyk & Jean-Louis Gardies, Statutory
Interpretation in France, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 171, 183–
85 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETING
STATUTES].
12. See Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation—
Civilian Style, 44 TUL. L. REV. 704, 713 (1970) (“Even the most authoritative, and, with
due respect, most conservative treatise on German civil law gives a strongly worded
warning against applying the plain meaning rule. However, in practice it does reappear
now and then, and when it does, it usually meets with severe criticism.” (internal citation
omitted)).
13. The most famous statement comes from Justice Scalia’s quotation of Judge
Leventhal saying that combing through legislative history for support is “the equivalent of
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s
friends.” Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). I argue here
that if legislative history comes from choosing friends at a cocktail party, citation of case
precedent comes from a president choosing among friends at an inaugural ball.
14. See Pojanowski, supra note 2, at 480.
15. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 13. See generally EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REASONING (1948) (describing this view, which makes much more of
distinctions among holding, dicta, and justificatory argument than do contemporary
American courts).
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There has, indeed, been general debate about the role that the
common law tradition should play in statutory interpretation. On one
side, commentators and jurists including the late Justice Scalia argue
that when judges sit as interpreters of statutes they should shed their
common law mantles, take a back seat, and acknowledge the primacy
of the legislature. This, the argument goes, requires courts to do less
searching for the “best” interpretation based on considerations
outside the legislation and to pay more attention to the text itself.16 A
recent article by Jeffrey Pojanowski17 summarizes this discussion, with
scholars such as Professors John Manning18 and Adrian Vermeule19
joining Scalia in warning against overreliance on common law
reasoning. Judge Frank Easterbrook has similarly called for judges to
stand back from their common law inclinations in statutory cases.20
On the other side, writers including Professor William Eskridge,21
Judge Guido Calabresi,22 and Professor Peter Strauss23 argue that
embedding statutory interpretation into a larger framework that
includes common law reasoning creates a balance between stability
and dynamism that is appropriate for judicial decision-making.
Despite the sometimes vituperative debates over interpretive
methods, judges from both camps rely on precedent to expand or
contract their arsenal of interpretive tools. This ubiquity of precedent
on both ends of the spectrum should not come as a surprise.
Adherence to precedent furthers both uniformity and stability in the

16. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17.
17. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1357, 1374–75 (2015).
18. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 4, at 450; John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003).
19. Adrian Vermeule objects to courts’ use of canons of construction, since they are
virtually all judicial constructs and judges are generally less competent than agencies to
make interpretive decisions. See VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 200–02.
20. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983).
21. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 107–
09 (1994) (arguing that judges should take into account reliance on earlier judicial
decisions, among other changes in the legal landscape, in subsequent interpretations of a
statute).
22. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 101 (1982) (arguing, as the title suggests, for
judges to have the power to modify statutory language over time as language evolves and
social context develops).
23. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225,
242–45 (1999) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law and Statutes] (establishing a common
law perspective on both legislating and interpreting legislation in the United States); Peter
L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV.
429, 436–37 (1994).
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law—important rule of law values.24 And, compared with reliance on
precedent in constitutional cases, reliance on statutory precedent
produces less long-term risk. When a court makes a decision contrary
to the intent of the legislature or contrary to values the legislature
now cherishes, regardless of the intent of an earlier, enacting
legislature, the legislature can override the court’s decision and regain
control of the statute’s application.25
Cutting across the various ways in which courts use judicial
precedent in statutory cases, this Article looks at its use as a
phenomenon in its own right. Indeed, specific judicial practices that
rely on precedent have received attention. One such practice is the
use of statutory stare decisis. Courts generally regard prior
interpretations of a law as settled and do not review them. When they
do review such precedent, they most often reaffirm earlier decisions
as entrenched, whether they would be the best decisions today or, for
that matter, were good decisions when initially made. In particular, a
high court is unlikely to reverse itself once it has ruled on a question
of statutory interpretation.26 Similarly, there has been substantial
discussion of the role that canons of construction should play in
judicial interpretation of statutes.27 Yet these—substantive and
24. These values are frequently articulated as motivation for legal decision-making.
See, e.g., Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action
by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 80–88 (1982).
25. For discussion of the actual practice of overriding judicial interpretations of
statutes, see generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1317, 1319–20 (2014) (surveying congressional overrides during that period and
noting a shift from “restorative overrides” to “policy-updating” overrides); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J.
331, 334 (1991) (surveying congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory
interpretation cases and positing that “statutory interpretation decisions are more
responsive to the expectations of the current Congress than to those of the enacting
Congress,” but that “the Court is also responsive to its own institutional and personal
preferences”); Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2014)
(commenting on Christiansen and Eskridge’s 2014 survey); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow
Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional
Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 512 (2009) (arguing that congressional overrides
of Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents are often construed narrowly, which
“threatens legislative supremacy and undermines the standard rationales offered for
adherence to precedent”).
26. William Eskridge has referred to this phenomenon as “super-strong” stare decisis.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988).
27. The seminal, critical work is Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). Since then, there have been many positions taken on both the
role of the canons generally and on the status of particular canons. For an excellent
empirical study of the battles over the application of many of the canons, see Anita
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grammatical canons alike—may also be seen as instances of judges
acting authoritatively in a realm in which they profess to be
subordinate.
Adherence to earlier interpretations of the same statute by a
high court and reliance on the canons of construction are only the tip
of the iceberg when it comes to reliance on precedent in statutory
cases. Judges, in particular Supreme Court Justices, often rely on
earlier judicial statements to justify just about every aspect of every
argument in every case, from how a court construed a word of
ordinary English decades ago to the assessment of historical fact set
forth in an earlier case. Furthermore, such reliance is neither limited
to nor more prominent among the more liberal, nontextualist
judges.28 All judges do it. While legal scholars and judges express
concern about the judiciary overstepping its proper role by inserting
judges’ own values into the interpretation of a statute, absent from
this discussion is a consideration of the vast extent to which courts
rely upon their own judicial opinions in ruling on the meaning and
application of laws.
This Article examines every precedent cited by Supreme Court
Justices in one five-to-three decision and two five-to-four decisions
dealing with statutory interpretation. What emerges is a picture of
indiscriminate citation to judicial authority. The overarching goal of
this methodology, I argue, is the quest for coherence. Judges care
about demonstrating that one interpretation fits better with past
practice than competing interpretations. Regardless of whether a
current decision coheres with the social or political context
surrounding a law’s enactment, the statute’s legislative history, its
interpretation by prior courts, judicial interpretation of other statutes,
the use of various interpretive principles, or other considerations,
judges appear to concern themselves with demonstrating that their
interpretation advances a narrative that is indisputably part of the
American legal tradition.29 However, because the narratives with

Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2016); see also ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 51–54 (2014); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 279–80, 282 (1990); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 51 (setting
forth fifty-seven “valid” canons of interpretation); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1,
1–7 (2005); Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling
Canons,” One to Seven, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 919–21 (2006).
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. The narrative structure of legal decision-making has been widely discussed. For a
seminal work, see generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING
THE LAW (2000).
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which a decision may cohere are many, the use of precedent in the
service of these arguments is largely unconstrained.
It is easy enough to criticize this practice—and this Article does
criticize it. Reliance upon random statements by a judge in an
unrelated case; excessive reliance on grammatical canons of
construction in the teeth of equally available argument to the
contrary; the use of precedent to establish the meaning of an
everyday word that has no fixed legal meaning; and the
“textualization” of earlier precedent30—replacing statutory language
with the language used by judges who had earlier written about the
statute—are all questionable practices. Moreover, such practices
undermine the principle of legislative primacy because they are either
based upon false assumptions about the legislative process31 or do not
concern themselves with the legislative process at all. Instead, they
place the judiciary at the center of the interpretive endeavor.
Yet legitimate reasons for referring to earlier decisions do exist.
Among them are the practice of statutory stare decisis mentioned
above; the establishment of certain canons of construction32
embodying generally accepted principles of statutory interpretation
(albeit judge-made principles); and the desire to create a coherent
body of law around language that is not sufficiently crisp to apply
uniformly without further interpretation. By distinguishing legitimate
and indiscriminate reliance on statutory precedent, this Article
attempts to separate the wheat from the chaff—or at least begin to do
so.
Part I briefly describes statutory stare decisis. Because this
Article supports this doctrine, the discussion serves as a baseline for
the more critical analysis of other applications of interpretation by
precedent. It should be noted at the outset, however, that stare decisis
is the quintessential principle of common law adjudication and is, for
the most part, in tension with legislative primacy.33 Its wide
acceptance in the realm of statutory interpretation speaks volumes
about the relationship between legislature and judiciary.

30. The expression comes from Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2007).
31. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 928–30 (2013) (summarizing the results of an empirical study).
32. These largely include the substantive canons, such as the presumption that laws
are intended to apply within the territory and not in foreign domains.
33. See infra Section I.A.
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Part II discusses more fully the range of reasons for employing
precedent as a method in statutory interpretation. In some ways this
method reinforces the core value of legislative primacy, while in other
ways it undermines that value. This Part then examines in detail the
use of precedent in one five-to-three and two five-to-four statutory
interpretation decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,34 each of which
involves the interpretation of a linguistically ambiguous statute,
requiring arguments beyond the law’s plain language. The analysis
examines every citation to a judicial opinion in each case, in one
instance numbering almost one hundred. The conclusions drawn from
that analysis paint a chaotic picture of how judges use precedent. In
some cases, the Justices engage one another, both sides arguing about
the same thing but disagreeing on the outcome. In other cases, the
two sides refer to distinct bodies of precedent, like ships passing in the
night. Sometimes Justices recognize that the case law does not give
rise to a single answer. On other occasions, a Justice might cite only
those precedents that support his or her position, either relying on the
other side to bring out opposing precedent or simply appearing
unconcerned about whether anyone notices.
Part II continues by comparing the conclusions drawn from these
case analyses to the baseline principles articulated in the discussion of
stare decisis in Part I. Precedent is used for stare decisis effect when
the case is said to resemble an earlier decision that has already
decided the issue at hand. As Part III reveals, however, precedent is
also used to support a host of arguments, ranging from establishing
the meanings of commonly used words, to the application of
grammatical and substantive canons of construction, and, perhaps
most interestingly, to the creation of narratives based on earlier
holdings in an effort to demonstrate that a Justice’s position better
coheres with past practice than the opposing position.
Part III focuses on the judicial values of stability and coherence
as explanations for courts’ heavy reliance on precedent in statutory
decisions.35 Significantly, these values are prominent in both common

34. The cases are: Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005); Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001).
35. These values are frequently articulated as justification for a high court’s issuing
decisions that have binding precedential effect. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, On
Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 730
(2012) (“Having the final say entrenches the Court’s role of helping to ensure stability,
coherence, and unity in the legal system, a role that the Court has claimed (sometimes
unsuccessfully) from the beginning.”).
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law and civil law theory.36 For this reason, it would be a mistake to
characterize the use of precedent in furtherance of these values as an
instance of judges being unable to free themselves from their
common law constraints in statutory cases. Rather, Part III posits that
it makes more sense both to understand stability and coherence as
general rule of law values, promoted in common law style, and to
examine the extent to which comfort with precedent leads judges to
extend their use of precedent in ways that cannot be justified by these
values.
Part IV presents an approach to the use of precedent in statutory
cases that begins by taking greater advantage of the traditional
distinction between holdings and dicta to sort out what precedent
must be adhered to and what is worth following only because it is
persuasive. While the distinction has been rightly criticized as difficult
to apply in some contexts, it can serve as a starting point in helping
judges and lawyers conceptually separate precedent that must be
followed from that which might be followed, if persuasive. In the
service of deference to the legislature, Part IV argues that judges
should justify reference to the persuasive precedent on substantive
grounds, rather than merely on the basis of its having been previously
said. In some ways, the distinction suggested here, while a
foundational part of traditional common law reasoning, better
resembles the approach to statutory cases used in many civil law
jurisdictions, where legislative primacy is considered the norm and
precedent is valued far less as a part of legal argument. Part IV then
offers specific suggestions for implementing the approach presented,
including the maintenance of statutory stare decisis and reduced
deference to various canons of construction.
I. STATUTORY STARE DECISIS: STABILITY IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF LAWS
A. The Propensity Not to Overrule Statutory Decisions
Often called “statutory stare decisis,” the principle that
precedents in statutory cases are not to be overturned lightly is
justified on several grounds.37 Chief among these justifications is the
36. See Strauss, Common Law and Statutes, supra note 23, at 234–36 for a discussion
of similarities and differences between the two types of systems with regard to statutory
interpretation.
37. The term “stare decisis” is used in this context to refer to what Frederick Schauer
calls “horizontal precedent,” the practice of a court’s adhering to earlier decisions even if
it disagrees with them, for the sake of continuity and stability. See Frederick Schauer,
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benefit that comes from knowing that the meaning of a statute is
settled, and thus that its interpretation can be relied on by those to
whom the statute applies. As Justice Brandeis once explained:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right. This is commonly true even where
the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can
be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier
decisions.38
Brandeis articulates the standard account: stare decisis should be
especially strong in statutory cases and especially weak in
constitutional cases, with, supposedly, a middle ground in common
law adjudication.39
But this stance is not without its detractors. For instance,
Professor Amy Coney Barrett, in an article criticizing lower courts for
adopting the doctrine, focuses on two widely discussed justifications
for statutory stare decisis: legislative acquiescence to the court’s
decision and separation of powers concerns, which make it more
appropriate for the legislature than the court to alter policy in the
wake of a court’s erroneous interpretive decision.40 Inferences of
legislative agreement based on the legislature’s failure to override an
earlier court decision have been criticized widely.41 There are many
reasons for a legislature not to act, only one of which is majority
Precedent, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 123, 124
(Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). “Vertical precedent,” in contrast, refers to the obligation of
lower courts to follow the precedents set by higher courts. Id. I return to the latter concept
below.
38. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
39. See generally, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis: Distinguishing
Common-Law, Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277 (2004)
(articulating this account and calling for greater adherence to precedent in constitutional
and common law cases).
40. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 317, 330–37 (2005).
41. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2053 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“Giving dispositive weight to congressional silence regarding a commonlaw decision of this Court effectively codifies that decision based only on Congress’ failure
to address it. This approach is at odds with our Constitution’s requirements for enacting
law.”); Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1251, 1252–54 (2013). For earlier discussion of the doctrine, see
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67
(1988).
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acquiescence to a court’s earlier interpretive decision.42 Moreover,
such acquiescence, when it does occur, says nothing about whether
the enacting legislature would have been pleased with how the
judiciary applied its work.43
More persuasive is the separation of powers rationale for the
doctrine, attributable in different versions to Justice Hugo Black44
and, more recently, Professor Lawrence Marshall.45 Justice Black first
recognized that courts must resolve ambiguities in statutes even when
such resolution is inseparable from a policy decision that, in an ideal
world, would have been the legislature’s to make.46 But he further
argued that nothing excuses a court’s revisiting its initial decision to
create new policy later:
When the law has been settled by an earlier case[,] then any
subsequent “reinterpretation” of the statute is gratuitous and
neither more nor less than an amendment: it is no different
from a judicial alteration of language that Congress itself placed
in the statute.
Altering the important provisions of a statute is a
legislative function. And the Constitution states simply and
unequivocally: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”47
Professor Marshall, expressing similar concerns, argues that imposing
a rule of absolute statutory stare decisis is the best way to discipline
both the courts (not to make legislative decisions beyond what is
necessary under their Article III obligations) and the legislature (to
override judicial decisions with which they disagree instead of waiting
for the courts to do the work for them).48
Yet, this bright-line argument fails to consider that statutory
stare decisis is not a norm set in stone. As William Eskridge has
pointed out, situations exist in which courts are less likely to give
deference to earlier statutory decisions.49 First, as Justice Frankfurter
advocated, in some instances statutory precedents arise casually,
42. See Barrett, supra note 40, at 334.
43. See id.
44. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 256–57 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting).
45. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 87 MICH. L. REV. 177, 182–83 (1989).
46. See Boys Mkts., Inc., 398 U.S. at 256–58 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 257–58 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I).
48. See Marshall, supra note 45, at 183.
49. ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 252–57.
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without sufficient analysis.50 When that happens, further reflection
may lead courts to change their minds. Second, as many have
observed, some statutes are considered “common law statutes” whose
doctrines develop over time through judicial decision-making.51
Finally, as Eskridge points out, the less reliance there has been on a
precedent, the less problematic would be its reversal for good cause.52
These various factors play out in the two illustrations presented
below.
B.

Two Scenarios
1. Weak Reliance, Strong History

Consider the following history of cases interpreting the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”).53 The statute makes common
carriers doing business in interstate commerce liable as a matter of
federal law for the death or injury of their employees.54 The statute
creates liability for
injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by
reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its
cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works,
boats, wharves, or other equipment.55
Because the language merely says, “resulting in whole or in part from
the [carrier’s negligence]” and “by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence,” on several occasions courts have
confronted the question of the statute’s standard of causation.
The first such case to reach the Supreme Court was Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.56 in 1957. Rogers, the plaintiff, had
been working on the tracks, burning weeds, when a column of air
created by a passing train fanned the flames. Rogers covered his face
and stepped backward, suffering a fall that caused him serious

50. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 220 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285–86
(1985). For the argument that relaxation of statutory stare decisis should be further
extended to allow common law development of statutory doctrine in certain
circumstances, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 299–302 (2010).
52. ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 255–57.
53. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
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injury.57 Some of the fault for the accident may have been Rogers’s
own.58 For that reason, after a jury verdict for Rogers in a Missouri
trial court, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed.59 The U.S.
Supreme Court then reversed the Missouri appellate court in a
unanimous decision, holding:
Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury
question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry
whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that
negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury
or death. . . . The statute expressly imposes liability upon the
employer to pay damages for injury or death due “in whole or
in part” to its negligence.60
In other words, contributory negligence is no bar to a case brought
under FELA, and therefore proof of proximate cause is less
demanding than under ordinary tort principles.
The same result ensued six years later in Gallick v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co.61 A railroad employee, working on the railroad’s
right of way near a fetid pool of standing water containing, among
other things, dead rats, received an insect bite.62 The bite eventually
led to an infection that coursed through his system and required the
amputation of both legs. He, too, sued in state court and found the
trial court’s judgment in his favor reversed for failure to establish
proximate causation.63 Again, the Supreme Court reversed in a
unanimous decision, holding that the only issue was whether the
defendant’s negligence played any role in causing the plaintiff’s
injuries.64 Congress did not require more exacting, common law proof
of proximate causation, and state appellate courts, accustomed to
reviewing jury instructions to determine their conformance with wellsettled common law principles, should understand that their role is
more constrained when enforcing a federal statute.65
It took more than half a century for the issue to arise again in the
Supreme Court, this time in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride,66

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 502.
Id. at 503–04.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 506–07 (citations omitted).
372 U.S. 108 (1963).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 112–13.
Id. at 116, 120–22.
Id. at 113–16.
131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016)

1180

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

decided in 2011. The basic story is similar to that of the earlier cases67:
McBride was a locomotive engineer for a freight train company. He
was sent on a run between Indiana and Illinois, which required adding
and removing railroad cars during a number of stops. An unusual
configuration of the engines required that McBride use a hand brake
to accomplish these tasks, which exposed him to additional risk of
injury. Sure enough, his hand was severely injured by a handbrake
that he had earlier complained was dangerous given the conditions of
its use.
McBride sued in federal district court and won. The jury was
given the standard Seventh Circuit instruction that accorded with the
decision in Rogers.68 In particular, there was no traditional common
law instruction on proximate causation. Rather, the jury was
instructed that the “Defendant ‘caused or contributed to’ Plaintiff’s
injury if Defendant’s negligence played a part—no matter how
small—in bringing about the injury.”69 CSX appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, which affirmed.70 The Supreme Court affirmed again, this
time in a five-to-four decision.71 Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority
opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.72
Justice Thomas, the deciding vote, joined in most of the opinion and
in the holding.73 Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices
Scalia, Alito, and Kennedy.74 Thus, apart from Justice Thomas, the
Justices voted predictably along ideological grounds, the liberals
favoring broader avenues for employees to sue an employer and the
conservatives wishing to constrain such actions more tightly.
In justifying the tighter, FELA-specific standard of proximate
cause, the majority opinion focused on the purpose and language of
the statute and made strong use of the earlier decisions: “Countless
judges have instructed countless juries in language drawn from
Rogers. To discard or restrict the Rogers instruction now would ill
serve the goals of ‘stability’ and ‘predictability’ that the doctrine of
statutory stare decisis aims to ensure.”75 The dissent accused the
majority of breaking new ground and noted that the Court had, in the
past, read the requirement of proximate causation into a statutory
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 2635–36.
Id. at 2636.
Id. at 2635.
Id. at 2635–36; McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2010).
McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2644.
Id. at 2634.
Id.
Id. at 2644.
Id. at 2641.
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scheme when the statute itself did not mention it.76 The dissent
further engaged in a lengthy parsing of Rogers, arguing that it was
never intended to be as broadly interpreted as the majority would
have it, but rather was limited to the facts of that case, which more
concerned contributory negligence than proximate causation.77
None of the Justices actually eschewed the principle of statutory
stare decisis. The dissent, however, would have interpreted Rogers so
narrowly as to make it largely irrelevant. Such a narrow reading of
precedent is prototypical common law reasoning. A statute is
interpreted by distinguishing cases that would have it construed
otherwise—all in the name of legislative primacy.
2. Weak History, Strong Reliance
The overall story of CSX Transportation is very similar to that of
Flood v. Kuhn,78 the poster child of strong stare decisis in statutory
cases. Some fifty years before the 1972 Kuhn decision, the Supreme
Court had decided, in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs,79 that baseball was not subject
to the antitrust laws since it was not interstate commerce.80 Thirty
years later, in Toolson v. New York Yankees,81 the Court, in a per
curiam decision, upheld Federal Baseball Club, not on the original
ground, but because significant business reliance on the earlier
decision had occurred in the interim and because only congressional
action could make the antitrust laws apply to baseball.82 The Court
further noted that in three decades Congress had never acted to
override the earlier decision.83
Thus, by the time Kurt Flood challenged his trade by the St.
Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies after the 1969 season,
baseball’s immunity from the antitrust laws had been entrenched for
half a century and reaffirmed at approximately the half-way point.
Flood challenged the so-called reserve clause, which would have
given the Phillies (as designee of the Cardinals) the right to hold
Flood to a one-year contract at eighty percent of his previous year’s
salary if he did not agree to the trade. The Court upheld the provision

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 2646 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2648–49.
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
Id. at 200.
346 U.S. 356 (1953).
Id. at 357.
Id.
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because of the consequences that reversal of the earlier decision
would have on the business of professional baseball.84
As Professor Stephen Ross points out in his excellent essay on
this case, the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the baseball
exemption was anything but a simple-minded application of stare
decisis to a bad decision.85 For one thing, it was a five-to-three
decision. Justice Marshall’s dissent succinctly describes the dividing
issue:
This is a difficult case because we are torn between the
principle of stare decisis and the knowledge that the decisions in
Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922),
and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953),
are totally at odds with more recent and better reasoned cases.86
The majority decided that reliance on the earlier decision,
combined with several failed congressional efforts to put baseball in
the same position as other sports that lacked exemption from the
antitrust laws, made stare decisis the better path, ultimately looking
to Congress to change the law in the future if it so desired.87
Acknowledging that baseball is indeed interstate commerce,88 the
majority concluded:
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and
almost two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases
judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed
those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere
inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to
disapprove them legislatively.89
Together, CSX Transportation and Kuhn tell a more subtle story
of statutory stare decisis than does the standard account
encompassing strong deference to judicial rulings in statutory cases.
For one thing, both courts were divided. For another, the rationales
were quite different. In CSX Transportation, most of the conservative
judges wanted to overturn a precedent that they did not like, while
the liberals wanted to preserve a precedent that they did like. The

84. Id.
85. Stephen F. Ross, The Story of Flood v. Kuhn: Dynamic Interpretation, at the Time,
in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 36 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey
& Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2011).
86. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 276 (majority opinion).
88. Id. at 282.
89. Id. at 283–84.
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liberals won.90 In Kuhn, the dissenters were two liberal judges
concerned chiefly about the inconsistency between the Court’s
exemption of baseball and the inclusion of other sports under the
antitrust laws.91
Such battles are fought from time to time. The year after the
Court decided CSX Transportation, it decided Kurns v. Railroad
Friction Products Corp.92 The question there was whether the Federal
Locomotive Inspection Act93 preempted state tort law.94 A decision
from 1926, applying standards no longer in effect, gave the Federal
Act broad preemptive priority over state law.95 When a railroad
employee was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he sued the
manufacturer of the locomotive on which he worked, claiming that it
was defectively designed and that he was not given adequate warning
about the dangers of the asbestos used in the brake linings.96 All nine
Justices agreed that the Federal Act preempted the defective design
claim brought under state law.97 The majority, however, construed the
earlier decision broadly to preempt and preclude the failure-to-warn
claim as well.98 Three dissenters would have construed the earlier
decision more narrowly to allow this claim.99 Here, again, the issue
was not the viability of the doctrine of statutory stare decisis but
rather how broadly to construe the earlier precedent relied upon—as
is so often the case in common law jurisprudence.
In contrast to both Kurns and CSX Transportation, the debate in
Kuhn was centered on the preservation of a decision that would
surely have come out differently at the time of the later case and was
probably a bad decision in the first place. The Court itself, however,
had triggered such reliance in the business community that the
majority believed it would be doing more harm than good to reverse
itself at so late a juncture.

90. For an excellent study showing that the swing vote in many five-to-four decisions
is made by a Justice who deviates from his or her ordinary political ideology because of
special concerns in the particular case, see Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The
Swing Justice, 75 J. POL. 1089, 1103 (2013).
91. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 291 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012).
93. 49 U.S.C. § 20701 (1992).
94. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264.
95. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
96. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264. The plaintiff died before the litigation was completed,
and his estate replaced him as plaintiff. Id. at 1264–65.
97. Id. at 1270.
98. Id. at 1268.
99. Id. at 1271 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016)

1184

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

An important qualifying note: there are very few Supreme Court
cases in which statutory stare decisis is expressly at issue.100 This is not
because the principle is irrelevant, but rather because the principle is
sufficiently embedded in the jurisprudence of statutory interpretation
that it is mostly beyond challenge.101 To illustrate, in 1993, the
Supreme Court decided Smith v. United States,102 holding that trading
a machine gun for illegal drugs constitutes “using a firearm” during
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.103 While subsequent
litigants may wish to test the breadth of the statute, which establishes
an enhanced sentence for those who use a firearm while buying or
selling illegal drugs, once the Supreme Court held that trading a
machine gun for drugs comes within the purview of the statute, that
question effectively became off-limits.104 The Supreme Court has no
reason to revisit the issue, and the lower courts are obliged to obey it.
In short, statutory stare decisis is common law reasoning per se.
II. PRECEDENT AS METHOD IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Notwithstanding the focus on maintaining stability in statutory
interpretation by adhering to prior decisions, very few statutory
decisions turn on whether a court should abandon an old
interpretation of a statutory provision in favor of a new
interpretation. This Part first explores various ways in which a court
may use precedent in statutory cases beyond merely applying it to
similar facts to produce consistent outcomes. It then discusses three
Supreme Court cases in detail. The cases reveal that the Justices at
times agree on the relevant case law but not on its relative
importance. More often, however, each side cites its own case law in
the service of creating a coherent narrative in which that side’s
position follows more directly from what has previously been decided.

100. The Supreme Court first used the term “statutory stare decisis” in 2007 in Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 368 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Since then, it has used the term five more times (including in the cases
discussed above). See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135, S. Ct. 2401, 2409, 2413–14
(2015); Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630,
2641 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010); Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85, 89 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
101. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 127.
102. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
103. Id. at 237; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2008).
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A. Why Courts Rely on Precedent in Statutory Cases Even When the
Precedent Does Not Address the Ultimate Issue
Courts articulate four reasons for why they care about what
earlier courts have said, even if what the earlier courts have said is not
determinative of the case at hand or, in some instances, is not even
determinative of the earlier case.
First, resolving uncertainty in light of decisions in cases that
construed a similar statute or resolved a similar interpretive problem
in a dissimilar statute can add coherence to the corpus juris, to use
Justice Scalia’s term.105 Just as a judge will take into account related
doctrines in contract law to decide whether to apply a disputed
contract law doctrine narrowly or expansively, that same judge will
attempt to avoid making a muddle out of a statutory regime in which
the statute at hand is situated. More generally but with less
conviction, the judge will also attempt to avoid making a muddle out
of the set of interpretive devices used to interpret statutes.
All judges engage in this process, in line with Ronald Dworkin’s
position that judges, whether in common law or statutory cases, are
obliged to make the law as good as it can be.106 The appeal of such
argumentation is increased by the fact that, as psychologists and
philosophers have argued persuasively, people draw indirect
inferences of intent from arguments about coherence.107 If d coheres
with a, b, and c, and an issue arises as to whether d comes within a
statute that includes the other three, we are likely to infer that the
legislature intended it to come within the statute by virtue of its
seeming like the other items, assuming that the language permits such
an inference. It should not be surprising, then, that judges categorize
a quest for coherence as a legislative value, making it easy to
substitute intent for coherence in judicial reasoning. Thus, one judge
may refer to cases in which courts have narrowly construed statutes
with features similar to the statute in the case at hand to show
coherence with the legal tradition, often attributing the quest for such
coherence to the enacting legislature. Yet another judge may, in the
same case, rely on legislative history showing that the legislature

105. W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991).
106. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 411 (1986).
107. See GILBERT HARMAN & SANJEEV KULKARNI, RELIABLE REASONING:
INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL LEARNING THEORY 10–11 (2007); Dan Simon, A Third
View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
511, 537–41 (2004). For further discussion, see SOLAN, supra note 7, at 150.
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intended the statute to have a broad meaning, each side thus creating
its own coherent historical narrative.108
A second reason for heavy reliance on case law in statutory
interpretation is to demonstrate that an argument falls within the
culture of legal reasoning and is thus entitled to some level of
deference. Reliance on grammatical canons of construction, such as
ejusdem generis109 and the rule of the last antecedent,110 fit into this
category. It would be foolish, some sixty years after Professor Karl
Llewellyn wrote his famous article on the malleability of the
canons,111 for anyone to argue seriously that the canons are applied
uniformly in all cases in which they are relevant. To the best of my
knowledge, no one does. Yet, as we shall see, judges continue to cite
these canons, not as the starting point for justifying their application
in a particular case, but rather for the purpose of suggesting that they
are sufficiently authoritative because they were used in earlier cases.
The same holds true for instances in which a court construes a
statutory word used in its ordinary sense because other courts have
similarly construed that word. Although recent literature suggests
that the legislature does not have such prior judicial interpretations in
mind when it drafts new code provisions,112 earlier cases are
frequently cited on the theory that the legislature does have these
earlier constructions in mind.113
Third, courts may actually develop principles that they wish to
follow so that interpretation proceeds in a path-dependent manner.114

108. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), is such a case. This Article
returns to coherence as a legal value in Part IV.
109. The Supreme Court has defined the canon as follows: “[I]t limits general terms
which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified; but it may not be used to
defeat the obvious purpose of legislation.” Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128
(1936). It is still accepted by judges and scholars of various political stripes. See SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 5, at 200, 211.
110. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 37–38 (1993). The
Supreme Court recently applied this principle in Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958,
962–63 (2016).
111. Llewellyn, supra note 27, at 395. Perhaps the canons, when read fairly, are not as
self-contradictory as Llewellyn argues; he makes his point by removing context from their
application. See POSNER, supra note 27, at 281. Nonetheless, canons are certainly not
reliable across-the-board principles of interpretation.
112. William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 171, 225 (2000); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 905.
113. See infra Part III.
114. For a discussion of path dependency in statutory interpretation, see Stephanie A.
Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying
the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1166 (2005). Such interpretive principles
need not be hard and fast rules, but may rather provide defaults, exceptions to which must
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Such principles include substantive canons of construction, among
them the rule of lenity,115 the rule of constitutional avoidance,116 and
the rule that laws are to be construed as applying only within the
territory.117 All of these canons are notoriously elastic and are applied
so unevenly as to appear more as background values than as precise
interpretive principles.118 Nonetheless, courts take them seriously, and
they appear to influence the outcome of cases.
Fourth, courts may rely upon principles that limit judges to a
certain set of methods that must be used in a prescribed order. Recent
scholarship, led by the work of Professor Abbe Gluck, has
characterized such methods under the rubric of “methodological stare
decisis.”119 Gluck’s review of the methods of statutory interpretation
used in five different states revealed that many states appear to have
adopted a type of modified textualism, in which extratextual material
is permissible when used to resolve uncertainty, but should not be
consulted when the language of the statute is dispositive. Among the
types of extratextual evidence used by courts when the language of
the statute is found to be indeterminate are legislative history,
grammatical canons of construction, substantive tie-breaking
principles, and additional contextual information. Using Wisconsin as
an example, Gluck traces the history of the state supreme court’s

be justified. See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 9–14 (2009).
115. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 57, 86–102 (1998) (discussing unevenness in the application of the lenity principle).
116. “[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). The
scope of this canon’s interpretation has also been controversial. Compare SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 5, at 247–51 (“A statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids
placing its constitutionality in doubt.”), with Bertrall L. Ross II, Against Constitutional
Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1253–61 (2011) (“[C]onstitutional mainstreaming
is neither a necessary nor proper prophylactic tool for the protection of the constitutional
core.”).
117. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
118. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 590 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, and
discussing the lack of precision in applying the canon of constitutional avoidance); Ross,
supra note 116, at 1211.
119. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1918–20 (2011); Ethan J. Leib &
Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
47, 47–49 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-costs-of-consensus-in-statutoryconstruction [http://perma.cc/BKG7-T4NA].
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establishment of this hierarchy of considerations.120 Lower courts
have adhered to this method, as have subsequent iterations of the
supreme court itself—even the very justices who expressed
disagreement with the method in the case in which it was
established.121 Gluck further notes that, globally, the states vary to
some extent with respect to the order in which these additional
materials may be used.
Although the use of a received body of methodological
precedent occurs more often in state courts than in federal courts,
constraints on the order in which interpretive principles are applied
appear in both. For example, it is fairly well established that the rule
of lenity is applied only after other interpretive methods fail to clarify
the meaning of a criminal law.122 Otherwise, any indeterminacy in
linguistic meaning would result in a defendant’s going free, no matter
how remote such a result is from either a reasonable interpretation of
the statute or the likely intent of the legislature (which are often the
same).123 This is a form of methodological stare decisis. For that
matter, so is the well-quoted statement of the Supreme Court: “The
task . . . begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language
of the statute itself.”124
Yet the consensus among the Justices is narrow. Rampant
disagreement remains as to what the correct set of ordering principles
should be, even in the midst of calls for uniformity125 and even though
consensus does exist on some points.126 In her empirical study of
statutory decisions in the Roberts Court, Professor Anita
Krishnakumar notes that the number of cases in which the Justices
“duel” over particular canons is relatively low.127 She further observes
that disagreement over both the basic tenets of textualism and the
malleability of the canons even where judges agree on the order in
120. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty. (In re Criminal Complaint), 681
N.W.2d 110, 122–27 (Wis. 2004); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 965.
121. Kalal, 681 N.W.2d at 127–28 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Gluck & Bressman,
supra note 31, at 965.
122. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
123. Thus, courts continue to refer to Justice Frankfurter’s approach to lenity, which is
to apply it late in the analysis. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
124. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (emphasis added).
125. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1880–81 (2008); Gluck, supra note 119, at
1907–12.
126. See SOLAN, supra note 7, at 51–54, and Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006), for discussion of the wide range of
interpretive methods that appear to be well established.
127. Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 934.
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which to apply them are grounds for pessimism with respect to the
establishment of uniform methodology in the federal courts.128
B.

Three Examples of the Diffuse Reliance on Precedent

Let us look more closely at just what the Supreme Court does
when it references earlier decisions in deciding current cases. I have
selected three close decisions in which the statutory issue presents
reasonable opportunities for both sides to make persuasive
arguments. In all three cases it is possible not only to analogize the
issue to others the Court has decided but also to distinguish the case
at hand from earlier cases. In the end, the Justices’ varied reasoning
all sounds very much like that of common law judges.
The first case, Small v. United States,129 concerns whether a law
prohibiting those convicted of a serious crime from owning a gun
should be applied when the predicate crime occurred outside the
United States. The second, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,130 concerns the interpretation of a civil rights law outlawing
employment discrimination. The law includes a 180-day limitation
period. The question presented was whether the limitation period
expires 180 days after the initial decision to discriminate in salary has
been made or whether, instead, each periodic payment constitutes a
new act of discrimination, effectively resetting the limitation period.
The third case, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,131 involved the
scope of an exemption to the Federal Arbitration Act (”FAA”) for
contracts of employment with employees “engaged in” interstate
commerce. The case considered whether the exemption should be
limited to transportation workers, who are expressly mentioned in the
statute, or should be more broadly construed to extend the exemption
to the furthest limits of the Commerce Clause.
1. Small v. United States
In Small, the question turned on the meaning of “any.” Gary
Small had been convicted and sentenced to five years in prison in
Japan for violating Japanese gun laws. He had smuggled firearms into
Japan by placing them in water heaters that he claimed to be
importing into the country as gifts.132 When Small returned to the
United States, he quickly bought a gun and was then prosecuted for
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 981–89.
544 U.S. 385 (2005).
550 U.S. 618 (2007).
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
Small, 544 U.S. at 395 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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violating a statute that makes it unlawful “for any person—who has
been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm.”133
The trial court rejected Small’s argument that the term “any court”
should be construed to refer only to domestic courts.134 He was
convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed.135 The Supreme Court
reversed in a five-to-three decision, with the majority opinion written
by Justice Breyer.136
How does one decide whether “any court” should be construed
as applying only within the United States or as applying worldwide?
The majority (correctly) held that the language alone cannot answer
the question because it is perfectly reasonable, if applying the statute
in isolation, to construe the language either way.137 When a
presidential candidate says he does not want to miss “any state” in his
campaign tour, he means all fifty. But when, as the majority notes,
after discussing films playing in local theaters, one friend says to the
other, “I’ll see any film,” the friend is most likely referring to those
films within the universe of films under discussion.138 It would be
strange to take someone up on that statement by insisting on seeing a
film that hadn’t been discussed.
Thus, one might look to the purpose of the statute, any extrinsic
evidence of intent, and existing custom with respect to interpreting
statutes extraterritorially. The last of these may also be seen as a
proxy for legislative intent or as an independently motivated principle
of statutory interpretation, viz. a substantive canon of construction. In
either case, some reference to the case law would be required to
determine the custom or verify the rule.
What tipped the case in favor of a territorial interpretation of
“any court” was the observation that conduct punishable in various
countries may not be criminal at all in the United States; thus the
majority defaulted to the presumption that laws are assumed to
govern conduct within the territory, absent evidence to the
contrary.139 There is a canon of construction to this effect, but, as the
133. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
134. See United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 770 (W.D. Pa. 2002), aff’d, 333
F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
135. Small v. United States, 333 F.3d 425, 425 (3d Cir. 2003).
136. Small, 544 U.S. at 386–87.
137. Id. at 388.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 389–91. In this regard, the Court noted the absence of legislative history one
way or the other that might have indicated whether Congress intended the law to include
crimes committed outside the United States. Id. at 393.
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majority concedes and the dissent exploits, Small was not convicted of
committing a crime abroad.140 Rather, he was convicted of committing
a crime in the United States, an element of which occurred abroad.141
Other arguments raised by the majority were grounded in the
structure of the statute taken as a whole, although the Court could
instead have resorted to case law. There is indeed a canon of
construction that tells courts that they should construe a statute so
that it makes sense as a whole.142 But the Court did not bother
referring to it. Instead, it noted:
For example, the statute specifies that predicate crimes include
“a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Again, the
language specifies that these predicate crimes include only
crimes that are “misdemeanor[s] under Federal or State law.” If
“convicted in any court” refers only to domestic convictions,
this language creates no problem. If the phrase also refers to
foreign convictions, the language creates an apparently
senseless distinction between (covered) domestic relations
misdemeanors committed within the United States and
(uncovered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed
abroad.143
The majority made additional arguments based on the statute’s
references to domestic law in defining various enhancements and
exceptions to the statute’s general scheme. The opinion
acknowledged that the purpose of the statute (keeping guns out of the
hands of firearm law offenders) would be better served by construing
the law extraterritorially but took comfort in the fact that there have
been very few cases over the years in which the statute could have
been applied to an overseas offender.144
The dissent, written by Justice Thomas, relied both on cases that
broadly construe “any” in other contexts145 and on the statute’s
purpose of keeping guns out of the hands of those convicted of

140. Id. at 389 (“And, although the presumption against extraterritorial application
does not apply directly to this case, we believe a similar assumption is appropriate when
we consider the scope of the phrase ‘convicted in any court’ here.”); id. at 399 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“In prosecuting Small, the Government is enforcing a domestic criminal
statute to punish domestic criminal conduct.”).
141. See id. at 387 (majority opinion).
142. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (arguing that the Court should
consider statutory language in light of the entire act).
143. Small, 544 U.S. at 391–92 (citations omitted).
144. See id. at 394.
145. See id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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serious crimes.146 But Justice Thomas relied most heavily on the
argument that the majority misapplied the canon disfavoring
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Rather than applying the
canon correctly, he argued, the majority created a new “clear
statement rule” that requires the legislature to indicate clearly its
intent that a law contains elements that include conduct abroad,
whatever may be the most reasonable interpretation and regardless of
legislative intent.147 Justice Breyer denied creating any such new
rule,148 and Justice Thomas rejected the denial.149
In making these arguments, each side cited case after case.
Sometimes, the citations were germane to the points being made. At
other times, however, the citations appear to justify arguments having
little to do with the usual uses of precedent—except to create the
impression that if another judge has said it before, such use makes it
more legitimate to act similarly now.
In all, the majority made seventeen citations to judicial decisions,
and the dissent made twenty-four.150 The table below shows how each
side supported its arguments with case law.151

146. See id. at 397.
147. Id. at 398–99.
148. Id. at 390 (majority opinion).
149. Id. at 398–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. In a footnote, the dissent also attempted to distinguish three of the cases used by
the majority, illustrating a narrow, contextualized understanding of “any.” See id. at 398
n.4 (first citing Nixon v Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004); then citing Raygor v.
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 540–41 (2002); and then citing Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245–46 (1985)).
151. The tables tally both sides’ citations to earlier case law in support of particular
arguments. In each of the three tables, the Court at times cites to the same case multiple
times for the same proposition. This Article is more concerned with the number of times
that the Court relies on precedent than with the number of cases cited. Thus, each citation
is reflected in the numbers in the table.
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Table 1—The Use of Precedent by the Majority and Dissenting
Opinions in Small v. United States
Argument
1. “Convicted in any court”
may include foreign convictions;
“any” is construed broadly in
some instances.
2. “Convicted in any court”
may not include foreign
convictions.
3. “Any” (and other general
words) should be understood in
context.
4. Congress legislates with
domestic concerns in mind.

Majority

Dissent

2152

4153

2154

0

6155

1156

4157

10158

152. Small, 544 U.S. at 387 (first citing United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir.
1989); and then citing United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757–59 (6th Cir. 1986)).
153. Id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S.
1, 5 (1997); then citing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130–31
(2002); then citing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1998); and then citing
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356, 358 (1994)).
154. Id. at 387 (majority opinion) (first citing United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 95
(2d Cir. 2003); and then citing United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir.
2000)).
155. Id. at 388 (first citing United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818);
then citing Nixon, 541 U.S. at 132; then citing Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. at 357; then citing
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1981);
then citing Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 149 (1960); and then citing Gonzales, 520
U.S. at 5).
156. Id. at 397 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132
(1993)).
157. Id. at 388 (majority opinion) (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993));
id. at 389 (first citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); then citing
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631; and then citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 249–51 (1991)).
158. Id. at 399–401 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
at 248; then citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371–72 (2005); then citing
Smith, 507 U.S. at 203–04; then citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 249–51; then citing
Foley Bros., Inc., 336 U.S. at 285–86; then citing Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630–34;
then citing Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5 (1993); then citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at
248; then citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993); and then citing
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630–34).
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Argument
5. There is justification from
the purpose of the statute for
thinking Congress intended
extraterritorial application.
6. Statute referring to
“convictions” has no modifier
and sets no limits.
7. Statutes must be construed
to avoid absurd results.
8. Court should adhere to
unambiguous meaning instead
of guessing intent.
9. Divining legislative intent
should not be a court’s goal.

[Vol. 94

Majority

Dissent

3159

0

0

2160

0

3161

0

2162

0

2163

The citations reveal some interesting patterns. Rows 1 and 2
show the majority’s references to lower court cases splitting over the
interpretation of a single statute as the basis for the Small Court’s
granting certiorari.164 The majority also cited cases quoting the
Supreme Court to the effect that “any” should be construed in
context.165 The dissent acknowledged this but also added to the list of
cases in which the Supreme Court has construed “any” broadly in
interpreting other statutes. One of these cases, relying on a dictionary

159. Id. at 393–94 (first citing Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112
(1983); then citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60–62, 66 (1980); and then citing
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974)).
160. Id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing Lewis, 445 U.S. at 60; and then
citing Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5).
161. Id. at 404 (first citing Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470–71 (1989);
then citing Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004); and then citing Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819)).
162. Id. at 405–06 (first citing Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 368 (1994); and
then citing Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994)).
163. See id. at 406 (first citing Beecham, 511 U.S. at 374; and then citing Koons Buick
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004)).
164. One basis for the Supreme Court accepting a case for review is a conflict among
the courts of appeals. Id. at 387 (majority opinion) (“Because the Circuits disagree about
the matter, we granted certiorari.”).
165. See cases cited supra note 155.
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to define “any,”166 was quoted verbatim to suggest that the dictionary
definition should have even more authority because the Court had
previously used it.167
Both sides cite many cases for the proposition that statutes
should generally be construed to apply within the territory, albeit for
opposing purposes. Breyer uses these cases to justify not giving an
extraterritorial interpretation to the statute at hand.168 Thomas uses
similar cases to argue that Breyer abuses the principle.169 The dissent
further uses case law to criticize the majority for caring about
legislative intent at all in the teeth of a statute whose language, as
demonstrated both by earlier case law and dictionary definitions, is
unambiguous on its face.
Small is a single case. Thus, no inferences about the general
practices of these individual Justices should be drawn. Nonetheless,
by examining a case that appears simple enough on its face, it quickly
becomes clear that the Justices believe that reference to an earlier
case in which a particular kind of argument was made lends credence
to the use of that argument in the case before the Court. It is also
important to note that there are a number of arguments on which
both sides weigh in, while only Justice Breyer writes specifically about
purpose (although Justice Thomas alludes to it), and only Justice
Thomas makes various textualist arguments and refers to the absurd
result rule.170 Krishnakumar’s empirical study shows that the Justices
duel far more often over Supreme Court precedent (sixty-three
percent of contested cases)171 than they duel over substantive canons
of construction (six percent of contested cases).172 Small contains
disputes over both case law and canons.
There are several core issues in this case: Is the language of the
statute susceptible to being understood and applied in more than one
way? If so, should the statute be construed extraterritorially to
include crimes committed abroad or confined to instances in which all
166. Small, 544 U.S. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97
(1976))).
167. Scholars have engaged in a great deal of analysis of the Supreme Court’s use of
dictionaries, especially since the appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court in 1986. For an
insightful recent work with reference to the literature on this issue, see generally James J.
Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries
in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013).
168. Small, 544 U.S. at 387–94.
169. Id. at 399–406 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. Compare supra Table 1, Rows 2 & 5, with supra Table 1, Rows 6–9.
171. Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 929 tbl.1.
172. Id.
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of the statute’s elements occur domestically? This question raises
additional ones: Did the legislature intend extraterritorial
application? Even if the legislature did not have any intent with
respect to this narrow issue, would limiting the statute’s domain
undermine the legislature’s purpose in enacting it? Should it matter
whether the crime in the foreign country is also a crime in the United
States? If so, how should the analysis of that issue occur? Will
criminal conduct go undeterred if the law is construed narrowly? Will
the Court create an incoherent jurisprudence if it decides the case one
way or the other? Some of these questions are best answered by
looking at earlier cases, but some are not. It should not matter that
judges have construed “any” broadly in some cases and narrowly in
others (although if courts construed the word uniformly in one
direction or the other as a matter of legal policy, that would be
relevant).173
In fact, the only facts that should be relevant to the
determination of this case are:
1. Lower courts disagreed about the interpretation of the
statute in question, which is the basis for the Supreme Court’s
grant of certiorari; and
2.

Courts prefer territorial interpretation of statutes.

Irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute are:
1. The use of the dictionary by courts in the past to define
“any”; and
2. The absurd result rule, because neither side has taken a
position that is absurd.174
Yet there is legitimate room for debate about whether the statute
should be applied to include conduct outside the United States.
Justice Thomas is right: usually, that rule applies to situations in
which the illegal conduct occurred abroad.175 But the statute in
173. Not much has changed since the Court decided Small. In Ali v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008), the Court revisited the meaning of “any” in the context of the
Federal Torts Claims Act. This time, Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, again citing
cases in which “any” was construed broadly to support the majority’s position that it
should be construed broadly in the context of that case as well. Id. at 218–20. Justice
Breyer remarked in dissent that when he asks his wife if there is any butter, he asks not of
the whole town, but merely of their refrigerator. Id. at 243–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. See Small, 544 U.S. at 404 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the absurd result
doctrine does not apply to the dissent’s interpretation).
175. Id. at 400 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
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question is different, and the majority’s interpretation of the canon on
territoriality does not fly in the face of prior decisions. The argument
thus structured is about the interpretation of a canon whose
application is subject to reasonable disagreement. In such a
circumstance, courts should concern themselves with furthering the
purposes of the statute and producing felicitous consequences rather
than focusing on the use of precedent. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that the Justices engaged in very little analogical reasoning.176 The
opinion contains little discussion of how particular precedents, while
not dispositive, were well reasoned and on point with respect to the
puzzle presented in this case.
What further makes Small interesting is that two legal values
conflict openly. The most efficient application of the law to the facts is
the majority’s: it keeps a simple presumption that laws apply within
the territory and avoids having to address the difficult question about
which foreign laws to credit.177 This result will likely cause fewer
problems for law enforcement, since very few prosecutions have been
brought where the predicate crime occurred in a foreign country.178
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the purpose
underlying the legislation would be better served by adopting the
dissenting opinion. When a person is imprisoned for smuggling
firearms into a foreign country and immediately buys more weaponry
upon his return, it is hard to imagine a more appropriate case for
prosecution based on a law intended to keep firearms out of the
hands of felons. Casting the issues in this light, much of the discussion
about precedent appears to be a smokescreen designed to cloak
policy disagreement in the garb of the judicially legitimate practice of
following precedent. Under the guise of deference to the legislature,
judges privilege their own preferences in interpreting statutes.
2. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Lilly Ledbetter worked for Goodyear, mostly as a supervisor,
from 1979 until her retirement in 1998.179 Shortly before her
retirement, she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
176. For a discussion of differences between analogical reasoning and adherence to
precedent, see Schauer, supra note 37, at 123–34. Only in the former are the substantive
merits of the argument relevant.
177. Small, 544 U.S. at 385.
178. See id. at 394 (“[A]ccording to the Government, since 1968, there have probably
been no more than ‘10 to a dozen’ instances in which such a foreign conviction has served
as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution.”).
179. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007); id. at 643
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a prerequisite for filing a
lawsuit under the Civil Rights Act. She claimed that her salary had
dipped significantly below those of men in the same position via a
history of smaller-than-average raises based upon bogus performance
reports.180 The relevant statute, part of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation . . . because
of such individual’s . . . sex.”181 She eventually filed suit in federal
district court, and the case was tried before a jury.182 Ledbetter won,
but the court of appeals reversed the judgment,183 concluding that
Ledbetter’s case had not been filed “within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” as the
statute requires.184 The court of appeals held that the term
“discriminate” in the statute refers to the initial willful act of deciding
to pay an employee less because of sex (or race, ethnicity, or another
protected category) and that the 180 days begins to run once that act
of discrimination has occurred.185 The court rejected Ledbetter’s
argument that each paycheck that paid her less because of her sex
constituted a separate act of discrimination.186
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. Writing
the majority opinion, Justice Alito devoted much of the opinion to
arguing that the weight of prior Supreme Court decisions construing
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in other contexts supported
Goodyear’s position. Goodyear had argued that the initial
discriminatory decision defined the time from which the statute
begins to run—rather than some later time when the plaintiff suffered
harm as a result of the earlier decision.187 The cases supporting
Goodyear’s position included a decision not to restore seniority to an
individual who claimed to have been wrongfully dismissed several

180. Id. at 621–22 (majority opinion); id. at 643–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
182. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622 (majority opinion); id. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
183. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2005).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
185. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1182–83.
186. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628–29. In “disparate treatment” cases of the kind that
Ledbetter brought, intent is an element of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(3) (“[A] rule
barring the employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a
controlled substance [without authorization] . . . shall be considered an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with an
intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); Chardon v.
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 301 U.S. 424, 432
(1971).
187. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622.
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years earlier;188 a case involving a professor who was denied tenure
but waited to file suit until his actual termination one year after the
tenure decision;189 and a case involving workers who were ultimately
dismissed because of a seniority plan that they claimed had been
adopted years earlier with discriminatory intent.190 However, the
Court ruled in another case that a series of acts creating a hostile
work environment may all be included within the period of the statute
of limitations, provided that the most recent act occurred within the
180-day statutory period.191 The majority distinguished that case from
Ledbetter’s situation, which did not include a claim of a hostile work
environment.192
Troublesome for the majority (and ipso facto helpful to the
dissent) was the case of Bazemore v. Friday.193 In Bazemore a
company abandoned an earlier, discriminatory seniority scheme in
favor of a nondiscriminatory one after the enactment of the civil
rights laws.194 Employees whose salaries remained depressed because
they had not received raises under the old system sued. The employer
argued that the statute of limitations had run, but the Supreme Court,
consistent with Ms. Ledbetter’s later position, held that each
paycheck constituted a new act of discrimination.195 In her dissent in
Ledbetter, Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on this decision,196
distinguishing the cases that the majority relied upon as involving
discreet, identifiable acts of discrimination. Discrimination in salary,
in contrast, may occur over a long period of time and may be very
difficult to discover because employees do not always share with one
another information about their earnings.197 Justice Alito, in turn,
responded to the dissent’s argument by distinguishing Bazemore,
because there, the earlier compensation scheme was intentionally
discriminatory: “Because Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that
Goodyear initially adopted its performance-based pay system in order
to discriminate on the basis of sex or that it later applied this system

188. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
189. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
190. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Ledbetter, 550
U.S. 618.
191. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117–18 (2002).
192. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 638–40.
193. 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
194. Id. at 390–91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 407 (White, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 395–96 (Brennan, J., concurring).
196. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
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to her within the charging period with any discriminatory animus,
Bazemore is of no help to her.”198
Below is a table describing the use of precedent by the two sides.
In total, there are ninety-nine citations to judicial decisions: forty-one
by the majority and fifty-eight by the dissent. Many of the cases cited
appear multiple times.
Table 2—The Use of Precedent by Majority and Dissenting
Opinions in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Argument
1. Filing period starts when a
discreet discriminatory act occurs.
2. Demonstrating split among
circuit courts.
3. The central element in a
disparate treatment claim is
intent.
4. Congress adopted a multistep
enforcement procedure for civil
rights cases, and courts should
apply the Act as written.

Majority

Dissent

16199

0

2200

0

3201

0

2202

0

198. Id. at 637 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 621 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002));
id. at 625–28 (first citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977); then
citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257–58 (1980); then citing Lorance v. AT&T
Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 907–08, 911 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; and
then citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); id. at 636 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); id. at 639
(citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); id. at 641–42 (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB,
362 U.S. 411, 416–17 (1960)).
200. Id. at 623 (first citing Forsyth v. Fed’n Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565 (2d
Cir. 2005); and then citing Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
201. Id. at 624 (first citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam);
then citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); and
then citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)). There is considerable overlap between Rows 1 and 3, with some cases being
used to make both points.
202. Id. at 629 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359
(1977)); id. at 630 (citing Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 819 (1980)).
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Argument

5. The courts should not
truncate Congress’s deadlines.
6. Statutes of limitation serve
the function of establishing
repose for employers.
7. Agency has no special claim
to deference in this context.
8. Reference to other acts.
9. Paychecks perpetuating past
discrimination are actionable.
10. Questions what constitutes
an unlawful employment practice
and when one has occurred.

1201

Majority

Dissent

5203

0

5204

0

4205

0

3206

0

0

15207

0

1208

203. Id. at 630 (first citing Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429
U.S. 229, 236–40 (1976); and then citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
47–49 (1974)); id. at 632 (first citing Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 826; then citing Morgan,
536 U.S. at 109; and then citing Elec. Workers, 429 U.S. at 236).
204. Id. at 630 (first citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55
(1974); then citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); then citing
Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256–57; and then citing Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 825); id. at 642
(citing Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 825).
205. Id. at 642 n.11 (first citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111 n.6; and then citing Reno v.
Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 n.5 (2000)).
206. Id. at 641–42 (first citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 909 (1989)),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as
recognized in Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; then citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,
226 n.8 (1982); and then citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416–17
(1960)).
207. Id. at 646–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (first citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S.
385, 395 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); and then citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111–12); id.
at 648 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115); id. at 649 (first citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117; then
citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395–96; and then citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 502 n.15 (1968)); id. at 654–55 (first citing Forsyth v. Fed’n
Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005); then citing Shea v. Rice, 409
F.3d 448, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); then citing Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d
1005, 1009–10 (10th Cir. 2002); then citing Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); then citing Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1025–29 (7th
Cir. 2003); then citing Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2001); then citing
Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167–68 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc);
then citing Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347–49 (4th Cir. 1994); and
then citing Gibbs v. Pierce Cty. Law Enf’t Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399–1400 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
208. Id. at 645 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110).
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Argument
11. Cases distinguish between
practices that are easy to detect
and those which are cumulative.
12. When a practice is
cumulatively discriminatory, it
doesn’t matter that some of the
events occurred before the
statutory period.
13. Employee salary information
is usually not published.
14. The statute begins to run
when a discreet act occurs.
15. Cutting off right to sue for
salary discrimination is
inconsistent with purpose of
statute.
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Majority

Dissent

0

5209

1210

5211

0

2212

0

5213

0

3214

209. Id. at 645 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114); id. at 647–48 (quoting Morgan, 536
U.S. at 110–15); id. at 651–52 (first citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902, 905; then citing Ricks,
449 U.S. at 253–54, 257–58; and then citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553,
554–57 (1977)).
210. Id. at 638 n.7 (majority opinion) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117).
211. Id. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117); id. at 649
n.2 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117); id. at 649 (first citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117; then
citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395–96; and then citing Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 502 n.15).
212. Id. at 649–50 (first citing Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1008; and then citing McMillan v.
Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 1998)).
213. Id. at 647 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 113); id. at 651 (first citing Ricks, 449
U.S. at 253–54, 257–58; and then citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 554–57); id. at 652 n.4 (citing
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 412, 414 (1960); id. at 652 (citing Lorance,
490 U.S. at 902, 905).
214. Id. at 654 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 119); id. at 660–61 (first citing Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977); and then citing Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
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Argument
16. Courts of appeals have
routinely supported employees’
positions in these cases.
18. EEOC is due deference.
19. Employers are adequately
protected from unfair suits.
20. Other statutes are not given
such hurdles.

1203

Majority

Dissent

0

9215

0

2216

0

7217

0

1218

The distribution of arguments in Ledbetter is quite different from
that in Small. In Small, the Justices generally agreed on the issues
presented and the import of the relevant cases. The Justices disagreed
only about how to weigh facts and values. Thomas relied heavily on
the legitimacy of established canons, which, in his view, would be
applied more or less mechanically as though they were themselves
statutes.219 Breyer, in contrast, concerned himself more with the
consequences of the decision and was more willing to look at the
canon as a rule of thumb whose application could be modified
according to the circumstances of the case.220 Neither side had a
strong argument on the plain language of the statute, although
Thomas relied heavily on a dictionary definition (and on an earlier
case citing that same definition with respect to another statute) in
215. Id. at 654–55 (first citing Forsyth v. Fed’n Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565,
573 (2d Cir. 2005); then citing Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); then
citing Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1025–29 (7th Cir. 2003); then
citing Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1009–10; then citing Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3d
Cir. 2001); then citing Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1999); then citing
Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167–68 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc);
then citing Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347–49 (4th Cir. 1994); and
then citing Gibbs v. Pierce Cty. Law Enf’t Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399–1400 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
216. Id. at 656 n.6 (first citing Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002);
and then citing Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518 (1986)).
217. Id. at 657–58 (first citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256–57; then citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at
121–22; and then citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)).
218. Id. at 658 (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208–10 (1974)).
219. See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 396–97, 399–400 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
220. Id. at 388–90 (majority opinion). For a discussion of this “pragmatic” approach to
judging, see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230–56 (2008).
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concluding that the meaning of the statute was less subject to multiple
interpretations than Breyer’s opinion would suggest.
In Ledbetter, on the other hand, the opposing Justices—Alito
and Ginsburg—operated from fundamentally different perspectives.
Alito paid lip service to the language of the statute being more
amenable to the majority’s interpretation than to the dissent’s, but
most of his opinion was devoted to common law reasoning. The
Court’s opinions, he argued, were more aligned with Goodyear’s
position than with Ledbetter’s.221 Ginsburg, in response, fought titfor-tat on the case law analysis, but added powerful argumentation
about the statute’s purpose.222 Note the number of rows in Table 2 in
which only one of the two opinions has any entry at all. This reflects
the importance that each side put on demonstrating that its position
fit coherently with the past. They disagreed only over how to
characterize the relevant past.
It should be noted that while Goodyear won the battle,
employers lost the war. The case became a campaign issue in the 2008
race between Senators Barack Obama and John McCain.223 Within
weeks of Obama’s inauguration, Congress passed and the president
signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,224 reversing the
results of the case. However, as Deborah Widiss points out, lower
courts continued for some time to refer to Ledbetter as precedent,
arguing that Congress did not fully override the decision, leaving the
precedent as authority on which courts may rely.225
In essence, both of these cases suggest that courts are more
aggressive in creating “common law statutes”226 than standard
221. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628–29 (majority opinion).
222. Id. at 651–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
223. Obama Highlights Support for Veterans, Working Women, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 19,
2008, at A5; David G. Savage, Two Visions of the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, May 19,
2008, at A8; Bob Egelko, Next President Will Shape Supreme Court, S.F. GATE (Oct. 20,
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Next-president-will-shape-SupremeCourt-3264700.php [http://perma.cc/6Y68-P3PG].
224. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(2012)).
225. See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 923 n.371 (2012). See
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 25, at 1442–45, for a discussion of how courts
routinely interpret statutory language to preserve previous decisions.
226. For early discussion of the concept of “common law statutes,” including legislation
such as the antitrust laws, see POSNER, supra note 51, at 285–88. For an argument that
criminal statutes, in particular those defining various species of fraud, should be
considered common law statutes, see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law
Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 373–78. We return to the creation of common law statutes
infra Part III.
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accounts of statutory interpretation that focus on the primacy of the
legislature would indicate—and they are certainly more aggressive
than their own rhetoric of deference to the legislature would suggest.
Judges focused on close questions, even with respect to narrow laws,
pay a great deal of attention to prior judicial interpretation, while
they often eschew legislative history as selective, irrelevant, or both.
3. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
Sinclair Adams, an employee of Circuit City, sued his employer
in a California state court under that state’s antidiscrimination laws.227
However, upon joining the company, he had signed an agreement
providing that disputes between him and Circuit City would be
resolved through arbitration. Accordingly, the company filed suit in
federal court under the Federal Arbitration Act, requesting that
Adams’ lawsuit be enjoined and that the matter be sent to arbitration
for resolution.228 Circuit City won in the district court.229 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,230 and the Supreme
Court reversed again in a five-to-four decision, reinstating the trial
court’s order that the case be arbitrated.231 Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion; Justices Stevens and Souter wrote dissenting
opinions.
At issue was the scope of an exemption under the Federal
Arbitration Act for employment contracts in section 1 of that Act,
and its relationship with the Act’s principle provision in section 2,
which requires that courts generally honor arbitration agreements.232
Section 2 provides that
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save

227. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–10 (2001).
228. Id. at 110.
229. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365 CAL, 1998 WL 1797183, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 4, 1998).
230. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
231. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 124.
232. Id. at 109.
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upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.233
The employment exception in section 1 states that the Act shall not
apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”234
At the time the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted, it was
generally understood that the Commerce Clause would apply only to
those workers who were actually working in the movement of goods
from state to state.235 Thus, it is possible that section 1 was intended to
apply only to transportation workers (as the majority held),
construing the words “or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce” to mean other transportation
workers by virtue of the canon ejusdem generis.236
But there is another possible reading of section 1. Congress may
have intended the exception to extend to all workers over whom the
Commerce Clause permitted federal legislation at the time that a
lawsuit was brought. The workers mentioned specifically in the
statute would then be classes of workers so identified. The ambiguity
thus resembles that of class bequests in the law of wills. For example,
if a testator says: “I leave $100,000 to my grandchildren, to be shared
equally among them,” the bequest can reasonably be thought to
evince the intent either for the money to be shared by her, say, four
grandchildren living at the time she wrote the will, or to be shared by
however many grandchildren are living at the time she dies (say
five).237 Similarly, the term “any class of workers” can be understood
as shorthand for whatever other transportation workers then came
within Commerce Clause regulatory power, or it can be understood to
mean whatever the Commerce Clause includes at the time of a
subsequent dispute. While the law of wills establishes a presumptive
preference for the latter interpretation, in statutory interpretation
233. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
234. § 1.
235. See Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 109.
236. Scalia and Garner describe the canon as follows: “Where general words follow an
enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same
general kind or class specifically mentioned . . . .” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 199.
Although its applicability in particular cases may be disputed (as in Circuit City Stores),
the principle is generally recognized as a legitimate canon of construction.
237. In the context of wills, the law presumes that a “class gift” was intended, unless
context suggests otherwise, meaning that the second interpretation, in which the
grandchildren alive at the time of the testator’s death inherit, prevails. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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there is no such presumption, and ordinary tools of interpretation
must be applied.238
The majority and dissenting Justices clashed over several issues.
First, they fought over a nuance in the different words used in
sections 1 and 2. Section 2 applies to contracts “evidencing a
transaction involving commerce,” while section 1 excludes contracts
of employment for those “engaged in” commerce. In an earlier case,
cited many times by both sides,239 the Court held that section 2 was
intended to be construed broadly to encompass the limits of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. That is, arbitration
under the FAA is favored to the full extent the Constitution permits.
“Engage in,” the majority held, is narrower in scope than
“evidencing,” suggesting that the exception to the rule was intended
to be more constrained than is the enforcement of arbitration
agreements under section 2.240 It is here that ejusdem generis241 comes
into play, as the majority argues that the “other workers” referred to
in the statute should be understood as being part of the same class of
workers as those specifically mentioned: namely, transportation
workers.242 The dissent acknowledged these arguments, but rejected
them more or less out of hand.243
Second, the Justices battled over history. The majority concerned
itself with the fact that its position agreed with most circuit courts to
have considered the question, the early history of the FAA (enacted
to combat judicial hostility to arbitration), and Supreme Court
238. See Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 995–98 (2008), for a discussion of this same ambiguity
in the context of interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act; see also Jill C.
Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522–27, 1574–75 (2014) (explaining by means of cognitive
psychology the failure of courts to observe the ambiguity in many instances). See SOLAN,
supra note 7, at 35–37, for further discussion of Circuit City Stores in the context of this
ambiguity.
239. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
240. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 115–16 (citing Dobson, 513 U.S. at 277).
241. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ejusdem generis” as
[a] canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list
of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of
the same class as those listed. For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs,
goats, or any other farm animals, the general language or any other farm animals—
despite its seeming breadth—would probably be held to include only four-legged,
hoofed mammals typically found on farms, and thus would exclude chickens.
Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
242. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 121 (citing Tractor Supply Co. v. Thoesen Tractor
Equip. Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997)).
243. Id. at 138–40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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precedent favoring arbitration.244 The dissent, in contrast, focused on
the legislative history of section 1 (which the majority rejected as
irrelevant, having found the language clear) and the earliest cases
interpreting the provisions, which tended to favor the dissenting
view.245
Third, the Justices disagreed about how to determine the
purpose of the statute. The majority cited the statute’s motivating
policy of encouraging arbitration by overcoming courts’ hostility to
alternative dispute resolution in 1925.246 The dissent instead focused
on the protection of workers from a policy that would close the
courthouse door to them.247
Table 3 tallies the number of cases cited by each side (the two
dissenting opinions are combined) to make these and related points.
In all, the majority employed forty-four citations to case law, the
dissent forty-one.

244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 111–12, 119–23 (majority opinion).
Id. at 125–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 111 (majority opinion).
See id. at 128–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Table 3—The Use of Precedent by Majority and Dissenting
Opinions in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams

Argument
1. The FAA does not apply
to employment contracts.
2. Strong circuit court
support for not all
employment contracts being
excluded from the FAA.
3. The FAA was a response
to courts’ hostility toward
arbitration.
4. The FAA is preemptive
of state law and applies in
state courts.
5. FAA enacted under
Commerce Clause and
interpreted to allow Congress
to exercise its commerce
power to the fullest extent.

Majority

Dissent

1248

2249

9250

1251

2252

0

2253

0

2254

0

248. Id. at 110 (majority opinion) (citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083,
1094 (9th Cir. 1999)).
249. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350
U.S. 198, 200, 201 n.3 (1956)); id. at 130–31 (citing Textile Workers Union of Am. v.
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
250. Id. at 110–11 (majority opinion) (first citing McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d
573, 575–76 (10th Cir. 1998); then citing O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274
(4th Cir. 1997); then citing Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997);
then citing Cole v. Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470–72 (D.C. Cir. 1997); then citing
Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747–48 (5th Cir. 1996); then citing Asplundh
Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596–601 (6th Cir. 1995); then citing Erving v. Va.
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); then citing Dickstein v.
DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); and then citing Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United
Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953)).
251. Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Tenney Eng’g, 207 F.2d at 452).
252. Id. at 111 (majority opinion) (first citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 270–71 (1995); and then citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
253. Id. at 122 (first citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); and then
citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272).
254. Id. at 112, 116 (first citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 405 (1967); and then citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277).
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6. Exclusion is limited to
transportation workers.
7. Securities case is not
relevant because not under a
contract of employment.
8. Employment contract not
a contract evidencing
commerce at all.
9. This would render
section 1 superfluous,
violating canon.
10. Earlier cases have read
section 2 expansively.
11. Ejusdem generis applies.
12. Ejusdem generis does
not apply.

[Vol. 94

Majority

Dissent

1255

0

1256

0

1257

1258

1259

0

2260

0

1261

0

0

6262

255. Id. at 112 (citing Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471).
256. Id. at 113–14 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20).
257. Id. at 113 (citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1999)).
258. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350
U.S. 198, 200, 201 n.3 (1956)).
259. Id. at 113–15 (majority opinion) (citing Pa. Dep’t of Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552, 562 (1990)).
260. Id. at 113–14 (first citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
279–80 (1995); and then citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20).
261. Id. at 114–15 (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129
(1991)).
262. Id. at 138 n.2, (Souter, J., dissenting) (first citing Norfolk & W. Ry., 499 U.S. at
129; then citing Fort Stewart Sch. v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990); then citing Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74–75 (1984); and then citing Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S.
124, 128 (1936)); id. at 140 n.4 (citing Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44 n.5 (1983)).
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compared with “evidencing
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commerce” or “in
commerce.”
14. Cases beginning in 1937
expanded Commerce Clause
power.
15. Employers’ Liability Act
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showed narrow reach of
Commerce Clause in
employment.
16. Argument from history
does not expand Clayton
Act’s scope beyond language.
17. Statutory provisions do
not necessarily have uniform
meaning.
18. No abstract formula can
answer extent to which
Congress has exercised its
Commerce Clause powers.
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263. Id. at 115–18 (majority opinion) (first citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848,
855 (2000); then citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277; then citing United States v. Am.
Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279–80 (1975); then citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 199–202 (1974); then citing FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312
U.S. 349, 350–51 (1941); then citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 477–78
(1914); then citing Second Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1912); and then citing
Emp’rs’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 498 (1908)).
264. Id. at 135–36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (first citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273–74;
then citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); then citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 271–76 (1918); and then citing Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. at 496, 498).
265. Id. at 116 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556
(1995)).
266. Id. (first citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 233 U.S. at 477–78; then citing Second Emp’rs’
Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. at 48–49; and then citing Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. at 498).
267. Id. at 117 (citing Gulf Oil Corp., 419 U.S. at 202).
268. Id. at 118 (citing Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 277).
269. Id. (citing A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520 (1942)).
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19. Do not use legislative
history where the meaning is
clear—Court cannot expand
statute’s reach based on
history.
20. Limiting section 1 to
transportation workers is
rational.
21. Advantages of
arbitration do not disappear
in employment context.
22. Antidiscrimination laws
apply in arbitrations.
23. View that only
transportation workers were
exempt under section 1 arose
in a 1954 case and was
rejected by other courts.
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270. Id. at 119–20 (first citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994); and
then citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 n.13 (1986)).
271. Id. at 121 (citing Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997)).
272. Id. at 122–23 (first citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 149 (2001); then citing
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995); and then citing
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 30–32 (1991)).
273. Id. at 123–24 (first citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 275; then quoting Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 26; then citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985); and then citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
274. Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (first citing Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal
Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 211, 224 (4th Cir. 1954); and then citing Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. Elec.
Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953)).
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24. Earlier circuit courts
were divided on whether
collective bargaining
agreements come within
section 1.
25. 1957 Supreme Court
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support for proposition that
section 1 applies generally to
employment contracts.
26. Broad Commerce
Clause reading of section 2
says nothing about how to
construe section 1.
27. Over time, a majority of
Justices have supported the
broader reading of section 1.
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275. Id. at 129 nn.9–10 (first citing Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d at 224; then citing
Elec. Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 100 (1st Cir. 1956), aff’d on other grounds,
353 U.S. 547 (1957); then citing Lincoln Mills of Ala. v. Textile Workers, 230 F.2d 81, 86
(5th Cir. 1956), rev’d on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); then citing Hoover Motor
Express Co., Inc. v. Teamsters, 217 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir. 1954); then citing Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Emps. v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1951); then
citing Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951); and then
citing Shirley-Herman Co. v. Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950)); id. at 129–30
(citing Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 882 (6th Cir. 1944)).
276. Id. at 130 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957)).
277. Id. at 134 & n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (first citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265; then
citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); then citing
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1995); then citing Willis
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311–12 (6th Cir. 1991); and then citing Gatliff
Coal, 142 F.2d at 882).
278. Id. at 131 & n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (first citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36, 38–41
(Stevens, J., dissenting); and then citing Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 466–68 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
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28. Strong proarbitration
stance of Court has pushed
interpretation.
29. Statute should be read
as a coherent whole.
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Note that, like Ledbetter and unlike Small, there is very little
overlap in the citations adduced by each side.
The three cases discussed precedent in overlapping ways, but
there are also some interesting differences. Small was about both a
semantic ambiguity that both sides acknowledged and the tension
between the purpose of the statute (keeping guns away from
convicted felons) and another legal doctrine—the doctrine that laws
are generally not construed extraterritorially. Both sides in the debate
recognized the issues, although they took opposite positions at the
end of the day. The cases they cited reflected their preferences.
Ledbetter contrasted reliance on a linguistic nuance (the ordinary
way to use the verb “discriminate” is with respect to volitional acts of
discrimination) with reliance on the purpose of the statute and the
intent of Congress in enacting it, which would have been unlikely to
provide a permanent safe harbor for employment discrimination to
those employers who did not get caught discriminating until their
employees learned that they were being treated differently. Thus,
each side referred to entirely different sets of precedent as each
attempted to create coherent narratives in which its position was the
better fit.
Finally, Circuit City Stores combined aspects of each of the other
two cases. Both sides regarded the history of interpretation as
important and used precedent to recite that history. Both sides also
recognized that the Court had only recently read section 2 of the
279. Id. at 132 nn.14–15 (first citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20; then citing Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); then citing Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); then citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); then citing Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); then citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); then citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967); and then citing O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir.
1997)).
280. Id. at 137 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215,
221 (1991)).
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FAA expansively to include the full range of cases permitted under
the Commerce Clause. But the two sides differed on the nature of the
historical narrative they wished this case to supplement.281 They
further disagreed on which episodes in the interpretive history of
these and related statutes they wished to emphasize. This resulted in
some overlap in precedents cited, but also in a number of differences.
Others have noted that the citation practices of individual judges
track their political ideologies.282 This should not be surprising, since
studies show that judges appointed by Democrats tend to make more
liberal decisions than do those appointed by Republicans in cases
concerning the validity of interpretations by administrative agencies,
each side tending to support administrative decisions made by an
administration of the same party that appointed the judge.283 The
cases discussed above, however, show more than the Justices’
propensity to rule consistently with their political values. These cases
show relative uniformity in placing precedent above serious inquiry
into legislative intent as a value in statutory interpretation. Other
than Ronald Dworkin284 (to whose work we return in the next Part of
this Article), it is difficult to find judges and scholars who openly
espouse such a priority.
C.

Textualization of Precedent and the Development of Common
Law Statutes

Approximately a decade ago in an important article, Peter
Tiersma wrote of “the textualization of precedent.”285 This occurs
when a court analyzes the language used by a prior court as though
that language is a law.286 It is a significant part of today’s common law
reasoning, at least in American courts.287 However, it is a departure

281. See DWORKIN, supra note 106, at 228–32 (likening statutory interpretation to
writing the next chapter in a chain novel). I return to Dworkin’s metaphor at infra note
338 and accompanying text.
282. See Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2268707 [http://perma.cc/2DUX-LNSS].
283. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–27 (2006); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1091
(2008).
284. See DWORKIN, supra note 106, at 337–41.
285. Tiersma, supra note 30, at 1188.
286. Id. at 1243, 1247.
287. See, e.g., id. at 1247–62 (providing examples of how this textualization has
occurred).
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from classical common law analysis, in which the holding is
considered to have precedential effect, but not the reasoning.
When applying traditional common law analysis, lower courts are
obliged, and higher courts are presumptively inclined, to follow the
holdings of earlier cases. But, as Edward Levi noted in his classic
introduction to legal reasoning, the distinction between holding and
dicta forced judges to take responsibility for making their own
decisions in subsequent cases.288 Thus, appellate judges traditionally
justified their decisions with analogical reasoning rather than by
virtue of rule-like general pronouncements—or at least they did so
more than they do today. Now, however, many judicial holdings
sound more like statutes than they do like individual holdings.
Compare this statement by the Supreme Court of California: “[W]e
hold that golfers have a limited duty of care to other players,
breached only if they intentionally injure them or engage in conduct
that is ‘so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary
activity involved in the sport[;]’ ”289 with this statement from the
Supreme Court of Kansas: “We hold that Dan Borth assumed the risk
of his employment as a matter of law.”290 The California court
announced a rule of general application. The Kansas court decided a
case.
But statutory cases are different. The reduction of precedent into
authoritative text promotes the development of what amounts to
common law statutes. Courts take their earlier language and regard it
as authoritative text,291 which, in turn, makes it desirable for a
subsequent court to create a coherent body of law by elaborating on
the language used by the earlier court. The result, almost of necessity,
is a heavy emphasis on what judges wrote in prior cases interpreting a
statute. I argue below that the practice is a good one when the reason
for the textualization is respect for the merits of an earlier decision,
but a bad one when precedent takes over as a justification for its own
sake.
Consider the following example. In 1976, Judge Henry Friendly
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
developed a hierarchy of inherent trademark strength under the

288. See LEVI, supra note 15, at 7–8.
289. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 590 (Cal. 2007).
290. Borth v. Borth, 561 P.2d 408, 416 (Kan. 1977).
291. See generally Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682 (1995)
(discussing this phenomenon in the context of constitutional adjudication).
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Lanham Act, which governs U.S. trademark law.292 The Supreme
Court has summarized Judge Friendly’s taxonomy as follows:
In the context of word marks, courts have applied the nowclassic test originally formulated by Judge Friendly, in which
word marks that are “arbitrary” (“Camel” cigarettes),
“fanciful” (“Kodak” film), or “suggestive” (“Tide” laundry
detergent) are held to be inherently distinctive.293
These categories receive automatic trademark protection and are
distinguished from the “generic,” which receive no trademark
protection, and the “descriptive,” which are eligible for protection
only after acquiring secondary meaning.294 Friendly did not make up
these categories entirely. Some of Friendly’s language came from the
common law of trademark, while other language came from the
Lanham Act itself.295 Judge Friendly was comfortable with this
partnership between the two branches of government:
The cases, and in some instances the Lanham Act, identify four
different categories of terms with respect to trademark
protection. Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly
reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of
protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.296
There was nothing radical about his opinion, which more or less
summarized the case law of the time.297 But his taxonomy followed by
the description of the meanings of these terms resonated with the
community of trademark judges, lawyers, and scholars, and has lasted
for some forty years—with no end in sight. His opinion has been cited
in more than one thousand cases298 and is itself a central pillar of
American trademark law.299 The Abercrombie categories (generic,

292. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976).
293. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (quoting
Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10–11).
294. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9–11 (defining other categories).
295. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012) (describing the ineligibility of descriptive
marks for trademark protection).
296. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9.
297. See id. at 9 (referring to prior case law as the basis of the categorization of
trademark distinctiveness).
298. Shepard’s Citations reports 1060 case citations as of April 15, 2016.
299. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:2 (4th ed. 2015); 1 CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III,
FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT 43(a) § 3:3 (2015).
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descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary and fanciful) have been used in
close proximity to each other in over 1700 cases.300
The case has stare decisis effect only in the Second Circuit. Thus,
it should not be surprising that district courts within the Second
Circuit refer to the case often, or that the Second Circuit itself refers
to its earlier decision and has not overruled itself.301 The case’s
influence, however, extends far beyond the Second Circuit. Not only
has it been quoted by the Supreme Court, which has no obligation to
refer to circuit court cases, but it has been widely cited by other courts
of appeals.302 Without question, Judge Friendly’s characterization of
trademarks is now fully textualized into American law.
Compare Judge Friendly’s decision to the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the word “pattern” in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell,303 a
1989 case interpreting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”). The Supreme Court was confronted
with determining whether a small number of allegedly illegal acts
conducted by a defendant as a single scheme to bribe officials
constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity,”304 a prerequisite to
finding RICO liability. A phone company in Minnesota had been
bribing public officials to get favorable rates from regulators. When
charged with a RICO violation, the company argued that it had
engaged in only one illegal scheme and therefore had not engaged in
a pattern, as the statute requires.305 The Court analyzed the language
and determined that the offending conduct might constitute a pattern.
A pattern, the Court held, requires both “continuity” and

300. Lexis search conducted April 15, 2016, in state and federal court databases
(generic w/25 suggestive w/25 arbitrary w/25 fanciful).
301. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d
Cir. 2001).
302. See, e.g., In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 41 (1st Cir. 2001); Ashley
Furniture v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 1999); Windmill Corp. v.
Kelly Foods Corp., Nos. 94-5874, 94-5890, 95-5137, 1996 WL 33251, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 26,
1996) (unpublished table decision); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 785 (8th
Cir. 1995); Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin,
Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d
934, 937 (10th Cir. 1983); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d
1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1979); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75,
79 (7th Cir. 1977).
303. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
304. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
305. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 234.
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“relatedness,”306 and it should be up to the trier of fact to determine
whether these elements were present.
Since then, courts have engaged in more than 300 analyses of
“continuity” and “relatedness” to determine RICO liability.307 The
word “pattern” is mentioned but has dropped out of the analysis. It is
not easy to tell whether, in many cases, a reasonable person’s concept
of a “pattern” would match up with what she might consider to have
“relatedness” and “continuity.” In short, the Court created its own
common law of RICO and acknowledged that it was doing so:
The limits of the relationship and continuity concepts that
combine to define a RICO pattern, and the precise methods by
which relatedness and continuity or its threat may be proved,
cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that it will always
be apparent whether in a particular case a “pattern of
racketeering activity” exists. The development of these
concepts must await future cases, absent a decision by Congress
to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as to the Act’s
intended scope.308
I include both of these examples to demonstrate that
textualization is itself neutral as to whether it creates order or chaos.
When a court elaborates on statutory language that is not sufficiently
clear to inform citizens of their rights and obligations, it benefits the
legal system. When a court substitutes judicial language for that of the
legislature without clarifying the law, it distorts the legislative output.
In either case, by textualizing prior cases and then analyzing these
texts as law, courts have taken a significant step in shifting the balance
of lawmaking from the legislature to the judiciary, despite purporting
to do just the opposite.
III. PRECEDENTIAL VALUES
This Part discusses the values that appear to underlie the heavy
reliance on precedent in statutory cases—especially a drive for
coherence, which often takes priority over the professed value of
legislative primacy in cases of statutory interpretation. The next Part
suggests potential changes in judicial practice (and corresponding
advocacy by lawyers).

306. Id. at 239 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Senator
McClellan)).
307. A Lexis search shows 106 circuit court opinions using “continuity” and
“relatedness” in close proximity, and 634 district court cases doing so as of April 15, 2016.
308. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243.
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In citing each other, judges signal to readers that “this is
something that has been said before.” When they cite multiple cases,
they are signaling, “this is something that has been said over and over
again.” Neither statement necessarily says anything about legislative
primacy, the value associated with statutory interpretation that courts
purport to follow. Rather, two values undergird the use of precedent
in statutory cases: stability and coherence.309 By stability, I refer to
traditional notions of stare decisis and obedience by lower courts to
the holdings of higher courts, sometimes referred to as adherence to
horizontal and vertical precedent, respectively.310 By coherence, I
mean concern about the body of law governing a particular statute
making sense as a whole and the body of law into which that statute
fits making sense as a whole. When courts focus excessively on these
values, they abdicate their responsibility to meet other important
criteria, such as respect for legislative primacy, substantive rule of law
values other than coherence, and concern about the consequences of
their decisions. No wonder law students have difficulty moving past
the citation of earlier cases to the strong substantive arguments
needed to carry the day in close cases!
Yet it would be too simple to complain that judges focus on these
values solely as an atavism of their common law roots. The civil law
also favors stability311 and coherence,312 but it expresses its respect for
these values without such extensive citation of earlier judicial
decisions. Thus, a better explanation might be that the use of
precedent in statutory cases emanates from basic rule of law values
that U.S. judges express in a common law style. If so, then it should
not be surprising that judges assure themselves—perhaps through the
citation of precedent—that their decisions are not causing the law to
be unstable, incoherent, or incapable of standing up to valid
argumentation to the contrary.
Justice Scalia himself presented two reasons for judges to
concern themselves with coherent decision-making in the realm of
statutory interpretation. The first was that enacting legislatures have
in the backs of their minds the need for new laws to make sense in the
309. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
311. See Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 12, at 716 (“Although the rule of stare
decisis is not generally recognized in any civil law system, our courts’ attitude toward their
own previous decisions is pretty much the same; and the higher a court, the greater will be
its reluctance to overrule its own decisions.”).
312. See, e.g., ZIPPELIUS, supra note 8, at 61. See generally ALEKSANDER PECZENIK,
ON LAW AND REASON (2008) (proposing a theory of legal reasoning in the civil law
tradition with coherence as its centerpiece).
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context of the larger legislative landscape into which they will be
embedded:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to
have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of
Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most
in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely
to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on
the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to
it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law
into which the provision must be integrated—a compatibility
which, by a benign fiction, we can assume Congress always has
in mind.313
This “benign fiction” may present itself in two different senses.
The stronger sense is that in drafting laws the legislature specifically
has in mind the current body of law and attempts to make the new
law fit well within it. The weaker sense assumes that Congress
generally, whether through carelessness or political expediency,
enacts laws whose interpretations may be either marshaled into a
coherent whole, or instead left to be applied inconsistently, and that
the courts should assume that Congress prefers them to adopt the
methodology that will make such laws coherent. For each version—
strong and weak—how benign the fiction is depends upon the extent
to which members of Congress really do have this compatibility in
mind.
As for the strong version of Scalia’s legal fiction, it is likely to be
somewhat elastic; true to some extent—especially with respect to
immediately adjacent statutory provisions—and false to some
extent—especially with respect to portions of a code remote from the
provision being interpreted and even more so with respect to other
regimes within the larger body of statutory law.
Scalia and Bryan Garner have recognized these nuances,314 as has
Professor Kent Greenawalt, who distinguishes between drawing
inferences of coherence from different provisions in a single statute
and drawing similar conclusions from statutes enacted at different

313. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
314. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 173 (“If [the statute being compared to the
one whose interpretation is at issue in a case] was enacted at the same time, and dealt with
the same subject, the argument could even be persuasive.”).
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times and regulating different subject matter.315 Much of the case law
applying Scalia’s “benign fiction,” however, does not. Rather, it
engages in what Professor William Buzbee has called “the one
Congress fiction,”316 in that it assumes that a single Congress wrote
the laws being compared in a single, code-like manner. Relying on
historical material that appears to reflect the intent of Congress,
Buzbee argues that the coherence arguments applied by the Court in
several cases tended to demonstrate an undermining of legislative
primacy, rather than an enhancement of it.317 In other words, Scalia’s
fiction was not benign.318
Similarly, in their important empirical study, Professors Abbe
Gluck and Lisa Bressman interviewed 137 congressional staff
members about which judicial doctrines they take into account when
drafting laws.319 Among them were the “whole act rule”320 and the
“whole code rule.”321 The drafters claimed to be aware of these
judicial doctrines but also claimed not to take them into account in
their drafting activities simply because it is “impractical” for drafters
to do so given the everyday rhythm of congressional work.322
Now consider the weaker sense in which Scalia’s description of
legislative intent may be accurate. Suppose that legislators do their
best to be coherent but, under the circumstances, cannot make all
laws consistent with each other either because of political realities

315. KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 27
(2013).
316. Buzbee, supra note 112, at 179–80.
317. See id. at 180–203 (discussing, principally, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997);
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
318. These are not the only problems with the rule’s applications. Even when the
judges agree upon the nature of the principle, they argue about which parts of the statute
to apply it in for particular cases and whether to extend out of a single statute into the
remainder of the code. See Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 970–71 for discussion.
319. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 905–06.
320. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the
plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”); see also SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 5, at 167 (endorsing the use of this canon); Ross, supra note 85, at
271–72 (recognizing the universality of the principle and criticizing it on grounds that it
fails to reflect actual legislative practice).
321. For discussion of the whole code principle, which presumes coherence across the
entire code, see Buzbee, supra note 112, at 221–25; Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory
Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 221, 225–26 (2010); Widiss, supra note 225, at 874–75. Notably, Scalia and
Garner express their reservations about the use of this interpretive strategy as well.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 172–73
322. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 954.
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that limit fully coherent drafting or simply because, as with all laws,
some of the circumstances in which the law will be applied are
unforeseen at the time of enactment. Let us further assume that
legislators, for the most part, understand that the courts are going to
be left with the task of statutory interpretation and that they approve
generally of judges caring about the laws being construed as mutually
consistent. This perspective seems to be consistent with Gluck and
Bressman’s findings. The staffers interviewed did not seem to object
to canons that impose coherent interpretation.
The weaker version of the coherence constraint on statutory
interpretation assigns a lesser role to the legislature in setting the
details of statutory law, because the generality of the legislature’s
instructions to the courts leaves much up to the judiciary. One can see
it in action when courts speak of the “general intent” of the
legislature. Thus, in Moskal v. United States,323 the Supreme Court
decided that a “falsely made” security included a document made to
contain false information, even though, at the time the relevant
statute was enacted, “falsely made” was synonymous with
“counterfeit.”324 The statute in question criminalized the interstate
trafficking of such documents.325 In support of its broad
interpretation, the Court noted that this outcome was consistent with
the statute’s “general intent” and “broad purpose,” which was to curb
the kind of illegal activity at issue in the case at hand.326 That is,
Congress would be satisfied with the Court’s construing the statute to
create a coherent jurisprudence around the law’s general goals.327
Such cases both call for coherence and define the value (legislative
purpose) around which decisions should cohere.
Let us now turn to Scalia’s second defense of coherence, which
did not take the legislative will into account at all. He argued that
judges, when given the choice, should opt for sense instead of
nonsense in statutory interpretation:
Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is
ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning
which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both

323. 498 U.S. 103 (1990).
324. Id. at 111.
325. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
326. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 110.
327. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 496–97 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(relying on the “general intent” of welfare statutes to give broad construction to a statute
providing certain benefits to children); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966)
(examining the “general intent” of Congress in connection with the Patent Act).
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previously and subsequently enacted law. We do so not because
that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers
must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress know
what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is our role
to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.328
If we do not care what the legislature had in mind, then we must have
some other reason for wanting to make sense out of the corpus juris.
And, of course, we do. Whether or not the legislators had a coherent
code in mind, the judges should care because the most basic rule of
law values demand that a legal system make sense to the population
that it governs. Recent empirical work by Tom Tyler and his
colleagues supports this proposition by showing that people respond
more positively to the legal system when they regard judges as having
made decisions based on concerns that citizens regard as legitimate.329
The case from which Scalia is quoted illustrates the tension
between legislative primacy and coherence as its own value. In West
Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey,330 the question was whether a
civil rights statute awarding “a reasonable attorney’s fee”331 to a
prevailing plaintiff included awarding the cost of expert fees. Scalia
argued coherence on behalf of the majority.332 A number of federal
statutes make reference to expert fees, suggesting that statutes
intended to include expert fees as part of attorney fees need do so
expressly.333 On the other hand, as the dissenting opinion pointed out,
Congress enacted the statute to override a Supreme Court decision
that appeared to Congress to be excessively stingy in permitting feeshifting. Accordingly, it would be surprising if Congress intended to
exclude expert fees.334 The dissent had the last word when the statute
was soon amended to include expert fees, overriding the Supreme
Court a second time.335

328. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991).
329. See, e.g., David B. Rottman & Tom R. Tyler, Thinking About Judges and Judicial
Performance: Perspective of the Public and Court Users, 4 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES
1046, 1049 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2541450 [https://perma
.cc/5DSB-JP9U]. I thank William Eskridge for pointing out the importance of Tyler’s work
in this regard.
330. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
331. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
332. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 101 (“[I]t is our role to make sense rather than
nonsense out of the corpus juris.”).
333. Id. at 89–90.
334. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1079 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)).
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Coherence is deeply embedded in rule of law values, as many
have noted. For example, Scott Shapiro bases his theory of “legality”
on the relationship between lawmaking and interpreting on the one
hand and “plan-making” and the execution of plans on the other.336 In
developing this approach, Shapiro notes from the beginning that
plans (and thus lawmaking) must be rational. He comments:
“Rationality not only demands that we fill in our plans over time; it
also counsels us to settle on plans of actions that are internally
consistent and consistent with each other.”337 This rationality
constraint applies generally, both to “bottom-up” planning—the stuff
of common law reasoning—and “top-down” planning—the stuff of
legislation. Returning to Scalia’s two justifications for judges
concerning themselves with coherent interpretation when one
interpretation of a law would make a provision incoherent with the
larger body of law and the other would make it fit more rationally, it
should be no surprise that judges choose the latter. This will be the
case whether they assume that the enacting legislators would have
wanted them to do so or, as institutional players, they have an
independent obligation to prefer sense to nonsense in statutory
interpretation—or both.
Similarly, Ronald Dworkin’s notion of integrity in law surely
incorporates coherence. Dworkin used the metaphor of each new
interpretation of a statute being the equivalent of a new chapter in a
chain novel.338 The interpretation must simultaneously advance the
interpretation of the statute to cover (or not cover) new situations
consistent with the highest values of the law and yet be mindful of the
statute’s past, which includes everything from the societal situation
that gave rise to its enactment, including the law’s legislative history,
to the language of the statute itself and thus to subsequent
interpretations by courts and other institutional actors. Moreover,
Dworkin’s concept of law as integrity has coherence embedded in its
core. For law to have integrity, it must be sufficiently coherent to
treat similar situations alike.339
Scholars writing in the civil law tradition also adduce coherence
as an important value in decision-making. To a large extent, they also
use precedent to demonstrate coherence, although they do so
differently since civil law systems do not have stare decisis as a
principle of binding law and cases are most often cited for their actual
336.
337.
338.
339.

SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 155 (2011).
Id. at 123.
See DWORKIN, supra note 106, at 228–38.
Id. at 219–24.
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holdings.340 Regardless of the practice concerning citation of
precedent, coherence is respected as a legal value in its own right,
often under the rubric of “systematic interpretation.”341 Civil law,
moreover, tends to adopt both Scalia’s weak legislative intent
argument and his purely systemic argument. Quoting the nineteenthcentury German legal scholar F.K. von Savigny, Reinhold Zippelius
notes: “ ‘[O]nly when we are clear about what a statute’s relationship
with the overall legal system is, and how the statute is to work within
the system,’ can we understand the thoughts of the legislator.”342 He
nonetheless further advocates for coherence as a value in its own
right.343 And Aleksander Peczenik, a legal theorist writing largely in
the civil law tradition, bases his entire theory of legal justification on
the concept of coherence,344 linking coherence to rationality,345 as does
Shapiro.346
Coherence, though, is a necessary but not a sufficient basis for
statutory interpretation. Things can be similar or different in all kinds
of ways, only some of which are relevant to how a legal system should
be structured.347 As the philosopher Nelson Goodman pointed out, we
do not judge similarity by counting the features that two things have
in common but rather by judging the overall importance of those
properties that are shared. He continues: “But importance is a highly
volatile matter, varying with every shift of context and interest, and
quite incapable of supporting the fixed distinctions that philosophers
so often seek to rest upon it.”348

340. See generally Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and
Comparative Analysis (examining the role of precedent in statutory interpretation in
Western legal systems), in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 11, at 461, 487–90.
341. See ZIPPELIUS, supra note 8, at 61–62; D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 11, at
511, 513–14.
342. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 8, at 61.
343. Id.
344. See PECZENIK, supra note 312, at 131–32.
345. See id. at 160–76.
346. See SHAPIRO, supra note 336, at 156.
347. In addition, we judge similarity in varying ways, sometimes caring about whether
two things have shared features and sometimes caring about whether pairs of objects are
similarly related to each other. See, e.g., Robert L. Goldstone, Douglas L. Medin & Dedre
Gentner, Relational Similarity and the Nonindependence of Features in Similarity
Judgments, 23 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 222, 248 (1991); see also Amos Tversky & Itamar
Gati, Studies of Similarity, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 79, 81–82 (Eleanor
Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978) (accounting for similarity based on the number of
shared and unique features and then weighing the features based on context).
348. NELSON GOODMAN, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in PROBLEMS AND PROJECTS
437, 444 (1972).
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For Dworkin, the “important” values around which law should
cohere are values that respect the rights of the population similarly at
the level of abstraction at which those rights are best articulated.349 As
Dworkin points out, a court with a coherent and consistent history of
construing laws to grant minorities as few rights as possible within the
confines of statutory language is indeed consistent and coherent, but
is wrong-minded in some serious way.350 A coherent set of
interpretations by definition must cohere around something, and
respect for coherence without articulating what that something may
be can lead a legal system to promote values that undermine the goals
of the legislature. Once a court has developed precedents that value a
particular set of principles, loyalty to those values may supersede
loyalty to the value of legislative primacy, leading a court to elevate
its own values over those of the enacting legislature. Because it
accomplishes this through a means that receives little or no
criticism—the citation of earlier judicial decisions—this strategy is
likely to be successful—at least temporarily. Recall that this was
precisely the criticism that the dissenting opinions offered in
Ledbetter351 and Circuit City.352 Ledbetter was overridden by
Congress.353 Yet the threat of override is a poor solution to the
problem of judges placing their own values above those of the
legislature in interpreting statutes. The possibility that disrespect for
legislative intent can be repaired is a distant second to not
disregarding the legislative will in the first place.354
This point is driven home by an empirical study conducted by
Professors Stephanie Lindquist and Frank Cross.355 In an initial study,
Lindquist and Cross found that ideology played a significant role in
appellate decisions where the court identified the case as one of “first
impression.”356 They then examined a large number of cases decided
by U.S. Courts of Appeals in which the question was whether a
government official had acted “under color of state law” for purposes
349. See DWORKIN, supra note 106, at 227–28.
350. See id.
351. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 660–61 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
352. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132–33 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
353. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (overriding Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).
354. Scholars have noted the difficulty in relying on the legislative process to override
mistaken judicial decisions. See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 114, at 248–51.
355. See Lindquist & Cross, supra note 114, at 1180–86, 1191–1201
356. Id. at 1183.
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of § 1983.357 Their study covered the period from 1961, when the
Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Monroe v. Pape,358
through 1990. Seven of the federal judicial circuits were included in
the study. The goal was to determine whether the ideology of the
circuit court judges played a diminishing role in the judges’ votes as
both Supreme Court and circuit court precedent developed.
The studies showed that precedent appeared to constrain judges
for an initial period. Strikingly, as the amount of relevant precedent
grew, its impact diminished and ideology came once again to the
fore.359 Conservative judges began voting more conservatively, liberal
judges more liberally. Apparently, as the opportunity to create
various narratives increases, judges feel and act as though precedent
constrains them less.360 To the extent that this is true, it reveals a
serious problem with reliance on precedent in statutory cases,
especially when the statute has generated a robust body of case law.361
It suggests that the will of the judge increasingly supersedes the will of
the legislature as the opportunity to do so expands by virtue of
additional precedent.
IV. USING TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW VALUES TO ENCOURAGE
RESTRAINT
All of the forgoing suggests that courts should rely less on
precedent in statutory decisions. The hard question is how and where
the line should be drawn. It would be unwise to argue that judges
should hesitate to adopt the excellent reasoning of a judge in a prior
case, creating a common law for particular statutes through respect
for earlier reasoning. Judge Friendly’s lasting impact on the language
of trademark law illustrates the point well. Similarly, maintaining
stare decisis as a matter of presumptively adhering to prior holdings—
both by lower courts and by high courts in their respective roles—is a
practice worth keeping, subject to taking seriously issues of

357. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
358. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
359. Lindquist & Cross, supra note 114, at 1194–95.
360. Others have noted this phenomenon. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of
Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1400 (1995).
361. Lindquist and Cross also argue that the findings present a problem for Dworkin’s
theory of the chain novel, since he suggests that precedent should be progressively more
restricting. They appear correct in this instance, but there are many statutes in which the
political stakes are lower, and the system of refinement by precedent seems to work well.
See SOLAN, supra note 7, at 123–28.
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continuing reliance and changes in social circumstances that led to the
earlier decision.362
Nonetheless, reliance on precedent to the extent that American
courts engage in it is contrary to the stated goal of the courts to defer
to the legislature in instances of statutory interpretation. If, as I have
argued here,363 judges are often so embedded in a common law system
that they cannot adequately stem their ardor for ruling on the basis of
common law rather than statutory values, then it may be useful to
look at the style of opinion writing in civil law jurisdictions where the
detailed analysis of judicial decisions is less acceptable. Civil law
judgments in statutory cases have two characteristics that may be
instructive: they are short, and they do not generally make as much
reference to case law.364 This is not to suggest that European judges
are not aware of what courts within their jurisdictions have said or the
basic principles of statutory interpretation. Rather, they write in a
manner focused more on the legislature and less on themselves,
taking seriously the civil law notion that judges do not make law.365
They only interpret and apply the law that the legislature has
enacted.366
However, there are drawbacks to civil law interpretation as well.
The cost of such an approach is a lack of transparency. It becomes
easy to hide behind the illusion that statutory interpretation is a
matter of applying agreed-upon tools to cases that can be definitively
resolved. Moreover, as Peter Strauss points out so well, the
differences in rhetoric about the degree of deference to the legislature
between the civil law and common law approaches to statutory
interpretation may be far more profound than differences in
substance.367 While it may be worth investigating as a thought
experiment, asking French judges to begin to sound like U.S. judges,
or the converse, is unlikely to be a serious solution to the problems
raised in this Article.

362. See supra text accompanying note 220.
363. See supra Part III.
364. See Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative
Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 11, at 461, 487–90. See generally
Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 12 (discussing the numerous differences between civil
and common law with respect to statutory interpretation).
365. For an excellent discussion of how this perspective leads not only to judges being
taken seriously but also being given a back seat in the French legal system, see MITCHEL
DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 172–73 (2009).
366. Id.
367. Strauss, Common Law and Statutes, supra note 23, at 234–36.
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Thus, without pretending to have become civil law judges,
common law judges should take far more seriously the question of
whether and to what extent their reliance on earlier pronouncements
by their own branch of government dominates the pronouncements of
the legislative branch. I cannot propose a formula that will at once
include all of the useful things that courts appropriately cite from
earlier cases and exclude those that are more self-aggrandizing than
intellectually valuable. Yet the core of such an approach should
consider the difference between reasoning by analogy and adhering to
precedent.368 As Schauer explains, the former requires that one
establish the relevance of an earlier argument that one wishes to
apply to a later case. The latter is a matter of obedience, even when
one disagrees with the earlier decision or would not follow the
reasoning that established the earlier precedent.369 I suggest below
that many uses of precedent should require justification in each
instance or should be dispensed with, while others (including
horizontal stare decisis) may be applied simply because of their
precedential status.
An initial step for judges to take in approaching the question is
to separate holding and dicta along traditional lines. Much has been
written about the difficulty in sorting out just what was necessary to
the decision in a case and what was peripheral, the traditional way in
which holding and dicta are separated.370 Nonetheless, accepting that
there will be line-drawing issues, using these concepts to sketch out
constraining considerations for reliance on precedent in statutory
interpretation may orient judges away from relying upon incidental
statements by judges in cases not closely related to the case at hand.
A thoughtful and thorough article by Michael Abramowicz and
Maxwell Stearns on the varying and inconsistent uses of the
holding/dicta distinction makes the following suggestion:
A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen
decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually
decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to
368. For thoughtful discussion of the two methods of argument and their similarities
and differences, see GREENAWALT, supra note 315, at 193–244.
369. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 125–27.
370. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 315, at 186–87; David Klein & Neal Devins,
Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2021, 2048 (2013) (“Our evidence suggests that the distinction between
holding and dictum is at once central to the American legal system and largely
irrelevant.”); Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the
Right of First Publication, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 372 (2001); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta
Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 223–24 (2010).
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the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case
counts as dicta.371
If, in a case concerning statutory interpretation, an earlier
judicial decision meets all three criteria identified above, the court
deciding the statutory case should be comfortable referring to the
earlier decision for its precedential value. Because the definition is
path-dependent, it is broad enough to include such procedural rulings
as standards for summary judgment and standards for appellate
review. It is also broad enough to include reasoning that led to the
judgment based on analysis of the facts, such as Judge Friendly’s
reasoning in Abercrombie & Fitch.372 However, it is not broad enough
to include reference to cases that define ordinary words, cases that
refer to canons, and cases that recite various historical narratives.
As for other references to earlier decisions, these should depend
on the extent to which they further such values as legislative primacy,
coherence, stability, and legitimacy. Courts should refer to them only
as persuasive and should take on the burden of explaining why they
are persuasive with respect to these and other rule of law values. This
should not be seen as a hard-and-fast rule, but rather as an attitudinal
posture, the goal of which is to assist judges in focusing less on what
the bench has said and more on what the legislature had in mind, or
on other substantive issues.
More specifically, I suggest that adoption of this approach would
lead to the following:
1. Statutory stare decisis remains as a principle of
interpretation. Disputes about how broadly to construe earlier
decisions are inevitable. Thus, cases like Flood v. Kuhn are
justified on grounds of precedent.373 By the same token, courts
should remain free to rely upon cases that announce established
rules of procedure, such as standards of review, the overall
operation of dispositive motions, and so on. While these
discussions often seem to be boilerplate pronouncements, they
typically reflect well-settled principles of procedure important
to the rule of law. Yet, when there is legitimate disagreement
about the breadth of earlier decisions, judges should be candid
in acknowledging it, which in turn will force courts to produce

371. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
1065 (2005). For a discussion of precedent as path dependency, see generally Lindquist &
Cross, supra note 114.
372. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976).
373. See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
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substantive arguments supporting the selection of one approach
over the other.
2. Courts should remain free to rely upon cases that articulate
well-settled substantive canons of construction, including the
rule of lenity and the rule that statutes are to be construed to
avoid constitutional issues. The caveats stated above apply here
as well. To the extent that there is reasonable debate about the
applicability of a canon to the case at hand, the uncertainty
should be acknowledged, and the position of the court (or
dissent) should be argued for substantively—not as a matter of
precedent. This may include the citation of earlier cases, but
their relevance should be argued. Thus, using Small v. United
States as an example, applying the rule that statutes are
generally interpreted as regulating conduct within the
territory374 would be justified only if the applicability of the
canon was considered by the court in the light of countervailing
considerations. In Small, the majority decision appears to have
met that test.
3. Coherence is at the heart of judicial decision-making. In
construing statutes, judges should be comfortable using earlier
holdings to demonstrate that the decision (or dissent) coheres
with a particular version of the history of the statute’s
enactment and interpretation, again, acknowledging and
arguing against reasonable alternative narratives. Because the
earlier precedents were not based on the facts of the case at
hand, their applicability must be established through analogical
reasoning. The competing histories in both Circuit City Stores
and Ledbetter illustrate the need for such argumentation.
Furthermore, coherence with historical narratives, such as
reliance on legislative history or on the social or political
circumstances that led to a law’s enactment, often need not be
centered around judicial opinions at all.
4. For the most part, the use of grammatical canons of
construction should receive no precedential weight. Their
application in any particular case should be defended on the
merits—not by the bare fact that judges have used the canon in
the past. The discussion of ejusdem generis in Circuit City
Stores is a case in point.375 This is not to say that judges should
not refer to the canons or to cases applying them. Rather, the
application of a grammatical canon in a particular case should
374. See 544 U.S. 385 (2005); see also supra text accompanying notes 137–44.
375. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001).
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be justified exclusively on the merits. Reliance upon earlier
applications must be justified as sufficiently analogous. This
position is similar to Judge Posner’s suggestion that the canons
are to be seen as rules of thumb to be justified by practical
reasoning in each instance.376
5. Along these same linguistic lines, the meanings of ordinary
words are not a matter of judicial precedent, and the use of a
particular dictionary to define a statutory word in an earlier
case has no status in subsequent decision-making. Thus, the
various judicial pronouncements about the word “any” in Small
have no place in judicial argumentation.
6. Finally, all other kinds of asides about earlier judicial
decisions found in the cases detailed in this Article should be
shed from the judicial repertoire to shift the center of attention
from judges to legislatures.
These suggestions should help to shift the center of gravity in
statutory decisions from the judiciary to the legislature. A focus on
holdings should play an initial constraining role. The definitions of
words in earlier cases are typically not based on the facts of the case;
grammatical canons are almost never dispositive, and their use rarely
engages the facts of a case. Other uses of precedent in decisionmaking about statutory interpretation fit the definition of holding, but
should be constrained as suggested in order to promote judicial
integrity.
CONCLUSION
Examining various doctrines concerning statutory interpretation
as a whole, this Article argues that, in combination, they amount to a
judicio-centric approach to statutory interpretation, rhetoric to the
contrary notwithstanding. Although this Article makes some concrete
suggestions, it is difficult to be absolute about the distribution of
appropriate and inappropriate categories for citation on a wholesale
basis. Rather, this Article attempts to provide a framework based on
the familiar holding/dicta distinction for judges to use in deciding
whether an earlier decision should be given any force beyond
whatever persuasive weight the judge can justify. Judges should ask
themselves each time they are tempted to justify their decision by
reference to what an earlier judge has pronounced how such citation
advances the values that they intend to advance. That is, perhaps, a
376. POSNER, supra note 27, at 81.
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good question for judges and scholars alike to ask themselves in any
event.
The proposals presented here are somewhat different from many
that have preceded them. This Article does not call for the
abandonment of the canons, for example.377 Rather, it calls for a shift
from arguing from precedent to arguing by analogy—a shift that
requires significantly more justification. This suggestion will not solve
all of the problems of statutory interpretation, of course. Even in the
cases discussed above, it is possible, within the framework presented
here, to present cogent alternative narratives capable of furthering
accepted values while providing sufficient analogy to past practice to
be justified on grounds of coherence. Nonetheless, a serious reduction
in the illusion of consistent past practice would lead the legal system
toward a more candid and robust reliance on the legislative will as
superseding the judicial will. And that is the principal stated goal of
statutory interpretation, as practitioners of all political stripes agree.

377. See VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 289–90; Eskridge, supra note 118, at 582.

